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The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of
Seeking "Uniformity" and "Legislative Intent" in Maritime
Personal Injury Cases
Robert Force*
Maritime personal injury claims require careful analysis of the status of the
parties because of the important distinctions that flow therefrom. A Jones Act'
cause of action may be invoked only by a seaman2 and may be asserted only
against the seaman's employer,3 including employers to whom the seaman may
have the status of a borrowed servant.4 The Jones Act requires proof of
negligence to support recovery.5 An action for unseaworthiness, a remedy
created by the Supreme Court under its constitutional authority to develop rules
of maritime law referred to as the "general maritime law," may be invoked only
by a seaman6 and may be asserted only against the owner of a vessel.7  An
action for unseaworthiness is not based on fault and requires only a showing that
the seaman's injury was caused by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel.'
Additionally, a seaman has a right under the general maritime law to recover for
maintenance and cure. This remedy is not based on fault and is considered an
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1. Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988), in The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483 (1903), the Supreme Court held a seaman does not have a cause of action
against his employer for injuries caused by the negligence of the master or crew. This holding was
legislatively overruled by the Jones Act, which, through the incorporation of the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), specifically created such an action and eliminated
the fellow servant doctrine (§ 51), contributory negligence (§ 53), and assumption of risk defenses
(§ 54). The Osceola, however, also held a seaman did have an action against the owner of the vessel
on which he served (which at that time was invariably the vessel of his employer) for injuries caused
by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It has been suggested the earlier unseaworthiness cases seemed
to require the unseaworthy condition be the result of negligence; but, if that were ever the rule, it was
clearly put to rest in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926 (1960). Today, the
seaman's unseaworthiness action is viewed as being a species of strict liability and may be
established without any showing of negligence.
2. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129, 80 S. Ct. 247 (1959).
3. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970); Matute v.
Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1991).
4. Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1983).
5. Gaddis v. Orgulf Transp. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. I11. 1988).
6. Stephenson v. McLean Contracting Co., 863 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1085, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989); Spearman v. United States, 690 F. Supp. 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
7. Cerqueira v. Cerqueira, 828 F.2d 863 (1 st Cir. 1987). See also Charles M. Davis, Maritime
Law Deskbook 90 (1991).
8. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926 (1960).
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incident of employment.9 Actions by seamen against non-employers may be
brought under the general maritime law and are predicated on tortious conduct
such as negligence,' ° but proof of negligence including the causation element
under the general maritime law is more demanding than under the Jones Act."
Maritime workers such as longshoremen have an action under the general
maritime law for injuries caused by the negligence of others," except to the
extent this has been modified by Congress. Congress has taken away both Jones
Act negligence and unseaworthiness remedies which the courts had extended to
longshoremen (Sieracki seamen). 3 However, Congress, in Section 905(b) of
the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), has preserved
the right of maritime workers to sue vessel owners for injuries and death caused
by the negligence of a vessel owner. 4 Congress has also preserved on behalf
of maritime workers all other remedies for injuries caused by persons who are
not their employers or vessel owners.' s However, Congress has modified the
rights of maritime workers by prohibiting actions against a worker's employer,
except in limited situations in which the employer is also the vessel owner, 6
and has provided maritime workers with a form of workers' compensation under
the LHWCA. 17  Persons, such as passengers, who are neither seamen nor
maritime workers have an action under the general maritime law against those
whose negligence or other tortious conduct causes them injury.I8
9. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S. Ct. 432 (1951).
10. Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1991); Baker v. Raymond
Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 2256 (1982); Turner
v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
11. Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1991); Petersen v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 784 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1986); Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 2256 (1982); Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355 (5th
Cir. 1980); Davis v. Hill Eng'g, Inc., 549 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1977); Turner v. Niagara Frontier
Transp. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Robert Force, Allocation of Risk and
Standard of Care Under the Jones Act: "Slight Negligence," "Slight Care"?, 25 J; Mar. L. & Com.
1, 4-5 n.4 (1994).
12. See Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b), 933 (1988).
See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953).
13. The Jones Act is unavailable as a remedy to non-seamen. See Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988); Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S.
1, 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946). Unseaworthiness of the vessel is unavailable as a cause of action to
maritime workers under the LHWCA. See Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
14. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
15. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1988).
16. Compare Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(a)
(1988) with § 905(b) (1988). See also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 103
S. Ct. 2541 (1983) (allowing a maritime worker to collect both workers' compensation under the
LHWCA and tort damages against an employer who was also vessel owner).
17. See Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-948a (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
18. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959);
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Initially, maritime law followed the common law and provided no action for
wrongful death and no survival action.' 9 The Jones Act created both wrongful
death and survival actions on behalf of a decedent seaman's dependents and his
estate.e Congress also enacted the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA),
thereby creating a wrongful death action on behalf of dependents of any person
who is killed through the tortious conduct of another in navigable waters three
miles from the shore of any state.2 The Supreme Court later created a similar
action under the general maritime law for "longshoremen" who are killed within
the three mile limit or on inland waters.22 Some lower federal courts have
recognized a survival action to accompany existing legislative or judicially
created wrongful death actions.2"
Not only does the existence of a cause of action and the elements thereof
depend on the status of the parties, but the items of damage that may be
recovered may vary as well. Prior to Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,24 one could
generalize that, in all personal injury cases, damages for pecuniary loss and pain
and suffering are recoverable.' Different rules are applicable in death cases
where, under the Jones Act and the DOHSA, the decedent's dependents may
recover only their financial loss occasioned by the decedent's death.26
Furthermore, the Jones Act provides for a survival action which enables the
decedent's estate to recover for the decedent's pain and suffering, lost wages, and
funeral expenses.27 Any action under the general maritime law (but not under
the Jones Act or the DOHSA) also permitted recovery for loss of consortium
(also called loss of society)28 and allowed awards of punitive damages. 29
Thus, in maritime personal injury and death actions, the status of the plaintiff,
Beard v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, 900 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1990).
19. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140 (1886).
20. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
21. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988).
22. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S. Ct.
261 (1987); Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974);
Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972).
24. 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
25. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897, 87
S. Ct. 201 (1966).
26. The DOHSA only authorizes recovery for pecuniary loss. Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
The Jones Act, as interpreted by the courts, allows a beneficiary to recover only for pecuniary loss
and not for recovery of non-pecuniary damages. See Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d
77, 79 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[C]ourts faced with the issue historically have held that non-pecuniary losses
are not recoverable under the Jones Act.").
27. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
28. Id. Gaudet loss of society damages were extended to the spouses of longshoremen injured
nonfatally in American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 100 S. Ct. 1073 (1980).
29. In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the status of the defendant, and the relationship between them have been crucial
in determining what right of action, if any, a plaintiff has against a defendant
and the damages recoverable in such action.
Enter Miles! Neither the facts in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.30 nor the
legal issues, which relate to the recovery of damages under the general maritime
law for loss of consortium and loss of future wages, are complicated. Ludwick
Torregano, a seaman aboard the vessel M/V Archon, was killed by a fellow crew
member while the vessel was docked at the port of Vancouver, Washington. His
mother,a' who was also the administratrix of his estate, brought wrongful death
and survival actions against a variety of defendants alleging negligence under the
Jones Act and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under the general
maritime law. The merits of these claims are not relevant to the decision of the
Supreme Court and will not be discussed. The plaintiff sought damages, inter
alia, for loss of consortium in her wrongful death action and for loss of future
income in the survival action. The Supreme Court had to determine whether she
was entitled to recover such damages under the general maritime law.
As a preliminary matter, the Miles Court stated: "If there has been any
doubt about the matter, we today make explicit that there is a general maritime
cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, adopting the reasoning of the
unanimous and carefully crafted opinion in Moragne."32 In Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.,33 the Court held the widow of a "longshoreman" who
qualified as a "Sieracki seaman"' and who was killed in territorial waters could
bring an action under the general maritime law for wrongful death against the
owner of the vessel based on unseaworthiness.
This consideration by the Court as to whether to "extend" the benefits of
Moragne to true seamen is a remarkable exercise in semantics and a
demonstration of selective amnesia in regard to the evolution of the
jurisprudentially created protections for seamen, later "extended" to certain
maritime workers. Why should there have been any doubt as to whether the
Moragne rule was applicable to true seamen? Only seamen have an action for
unseaworthiness under the general maritime law; longshoremen as a class do not.
The general maritime law remedy based on unseaworthiness was given to the
widow of Moragne not because her husband was a "longshoreman" but because
he was a pseudo-seaman, characterized at the time as a "Sieracki" seaman.
Previously, in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,3 5 the Supreme
Court held a longshoreman loading cargo in the hold of a ship could bring an
30. 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
31. The decedent's mother was not financially dependent on him. Id. at 22, 111 S. Ct. at 320.
32. Id. at 30, 111 S. Ct. at 324 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90
S. Ct. 1772 (1970)).
33. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
34. The term "Sieracki seaman" comes from Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66
S. Ct. 872 (1946). The status of a Sieracki seaman is explained infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
35. 272 U.S. 50, 47 S. Ct. 19 (1926).
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action under the Jones Act.36 Congress responded to this decision by taking
away from longshoremen the right to bring a Jones Act suit by removing their
status as Jones Act seamen, a status which had been bestowed by the Court.
37
Subsequently, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,8 the Supreme Court held the
warranty of seaworthiness available to seamen should be extended to a
longshoreman (stevedore) working on board a vessel. The Court stated:
Running through all of these cases, therefore, to sustain the
stevedore's recovery is a common core of policy which has been
controlling.... It is that for injuries incurred while working on board
the ship in navigable waters the stevedore is entitled to the seaman's
traditional and statutory protections, regardless of the fact that he is
employed immediately by another than the owner. For these purposes
he is, in short, a seaman because he is doing a seaman's work and
incurring a seaman's hazards.39
Hence, the Sieracki seaman was born. Such "seamen" were not classified
as seamen for Jones Act purposes and were not entitled to bring an action under
the Jones Act or to recover maintenance and cure. They were, however,
considered by the courts as seamen entitled to the seaman's remedy for injury
caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel until this right of action was taken away
by legislation in 1972.' Thus, if Moragne had not been classified as a
(Sieracki) seaman, he would not have been afforded the warranty of seaworthi-
ness extended to all seamen. Furthermore, the primary inquiry in Moragne was
not whether the Court should create a wrongful death action when "Sieracki
seamen" are killed in territorial waters, but rather whether it should create a
wrongful death remedy under the general maritime law when "seamen" are killed
in territorial waters as a result of a vessel's unseaworthiness. At the time
Moragne was decided, it would have been inconceivable that a Sieracki seaman
would be afforded greater rights under the general maritime law of unseaworthi-
ness than a true seaman. Conceptually, this would have been impossible because
the Sieracki seaman's right with respect to the warranty of seaworthiness was
derived from the right of true seamen. The impetus for the Moragne decision
36. Here the Court was actually construing the term "seaman" as used in the Jones Act, and
while the Court recognized that for most purposes "stevedores are not seamen," it nevertheless
included them within the protection of.the statute. The Court gave weight to the fact the work in
which the plaintiff was engaged-stowing freight in the hold-was work formerly performed by
members of the crew. Id. at 52, 47 S. Ct. at 19.
37. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988).
38. 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
39. Id. at 99, 66 S. Ct. at 880 (emphasis added).
40. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). The
remedy of unseaworthiness may be available to longshoremen who are not covered by the LHWCA.
Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
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was to provide a remedy for true seamen."' It was only fortuitous that this
result was achieved in a case involving a Sieracki seaman. The Moragne Court
was particularly disturbed by what it described as certain incongruities in the law.
Each of these incongruities related to the rights of true seamen.42 By repeatedly
referring to Moragne and to Gaudet (the decedent in another important case) as
"longshoremen," the Miles Court minimized and deflected the Moragne Court's
concern for the true seaman, and suggested that there was some significance to
a factual distinction which, in the opinion of this author, should have been of no
consequence to the damages issues before the Court.
A. Loss of Consortium (Loss of Society)
Moragne created a wrongful death action based on unseaworthiness for death
occurring in territorial waters. The Court, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet,4 3 later determined the scope of damages recoverable in such actions.
Gaudet held that, "under the maritime wrongful death remedy, the decedent's
dependents may recover damages for their loss of support, services, and society,
as well as funeral expenses." 44 Gaudet was later extended to allow recovery
for loss of consortium in cases of personal injury not resulting in death. 45 Thus,
it appeared that the Moragne-Gaudet decisions had settled the issue of whether
a seaman's family may recover for loss of consortium. Not so, said the Miles
Court. Moragne was not conclusive of the matter before it. Moragne involved
a longshoreman decedent (a Sieracki seaman), whereas in Miles the decedent had
been a Jones Act seaman (a true seaman). This is what prompted the Miles
41. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1784-85
(1970). This was acknowledged by the Miles Court. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26,
111 S. Ct. 317, 319 (1990).
42. As condensed in Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 576-77, 94 S. Ct. 806, 810-
11 (1974):
The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg
holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the
furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but
frequently not if he is killed....
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy
ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit-since a claim under
the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness-but not within the
territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims....
The third, and assertedly the "strangest" anomaly is that a true seaman-that is, a
member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no remedy for death
caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the
duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by
seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute.
(quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96, 90 S. Ct. at 1784) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
43. 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
44. Id. at 584, 94 S. Ct. at 814.
45. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
ROBERT FORCE
Court to "extend" the unseaworthiness action under the general maritime law to
a true (Jones Act) seaman's dependents before passing on the damages issue.
Likewise, because Gaudet also had involved a "longshoreman" who was a
Sieracki, not a Jones Act, seaman, the Gaudet Court "had no need to consider
the preclusive effect of DOHSA [on the scope of damages] for deaths on the
high seas, or [the preclusive effect of] the Jones Act [on the scope of damages]
for deaths of true seamen." 46
Having expressly held that an action based on unseaworthiness is available
under the general maritime law for the death of a true seaman47 in territorial
and inland waters, the Miles Court turned to the loss of consortium issue. It
began its discussion by observing that, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,4'
the Court held that damages for loss of consortium recoverable in a general
maritime law action for deaths occurring in territorial waters created in the
Moragne-Gaudet cases would not be extended to supplement actions brought
under the DOHSA for deaths occurring beyond three miles from shore. In the
DOHSA, Congress limited recovery to "pecuniary loss sustained by the persons
for whose benefit the suit is brought., 49 The Court in Miles believed the
"logic" underlying Higginbotham controlled its decision even though the DOHSA
was inapplicable because, in Miles, the death occurred in territorial waters.5"
The Court then looked to the Jones Act, inasmuch as the decedent in Miles had
been a Jones Act seaman. It noted that the Jones Act incorporates the
substantive provisions of the FELA. Although there is no express limitation as
to the damages recoverable under the FELA, that statute, from the earliest cases,
had been interpreted as precluding recovery for loss of consortium in death
actions. 51 The Miles Court concluded Congress must also have intended to
exclude recovery for loss of consortium from the Jones Act. The Court then
extrapolated the FELA rule from the Jones Act and applied it to the seaman's
general maritime law claim. Inasmuch as the Jones Act precludes recovery for
loss of consortium, "[it would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional
scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created
cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in
cases of death resulting from negligence. 5 2 Thus, the Court in Miles held there
can be "no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for the
wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman. ' '53  The Court also opined that its
decision to preclude recovery for loss of consortium in actions under the general
46. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 199 31, 111 S. Ct. 317, 325 (1990).
47. An action by or on behalf of a true seaman is the only kind of unseaworthiness action
recognized in maritime law today. See supra text accompanying note 6.
48. 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
49. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988).
50. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31, 111 S. Ct. at 325.
51. See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S. Ct. 192 (1913).
52. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32, Il1 S. Ct. at 326.
53. Id. at 33, 111 S. Ct. at 326.
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maritime law where a seaman has died in territorial waters had the benefit of
introducing uniformity in the law because actions under the general maritime law
would now be harmonious both with actions for Jones Act negligence regardless
of where death occurs and with actions brought under the DOHSA.
What then are the consequences to be expected from the Miles decision?
Much depends on how vigorously the Court pursues the twin pillars underlying
Miles: uniformity and deference to legislation. In the author's view, the
Supreme Court has the option to apply Miles in either an expansive or restrictive
manner. As will be developed, the Miles Court did not arrive at its decision by
a thorough examination of the history of maritime personal injury law, or by in-
depth statutory interpretation, or through an analysis of the principles of the
general maritime law. Rather, the Court based its decision on selective
examination of certain cases and statutes. It made no attempt to put the issues
into a contemporary context. It is, therefore, reasonable to predict that Miles
should have no effect on the recovery of pecuniary damages in maritime personal
injury actions. Similarly, it should have no effect on those types of non-
pecuniary damages, such as pain and suffering, that have long been accepted as
appropriate in maritime cases.
In the aftermath of Miles, however, lower federal courts and state courts
have had to deal with several specific questions:
1. Should a surviving dependent spouse be denied damages for loss
of consortium?
2. Should loss of consortium be denied in actions based on the
general maritime law for personal injuries not resulting in death?
3. Has the underlying basis for Gaudet been so undermined by the
quest for uniformity that loss of consortium should now be denied in all
actions under the general maritime law, including:
a. actions by seamen against non-employers;
b. actions involving non-seaman maritime workers such
as longshoremen;
c. actions arising from injury or death of parties, such as
passengers, who are not seamen or maritime workers?
Presently, there is no pre-ordained "right" answer to some of these questions;
and the Supreme Court, in defining the reach of Miles, could go either way in
answering the questions. In the lower courts, however, Miles has already had
some impact. At one extreme, in denying recovery of punitive damages (an
issue not addressed by the Supreme Court in Miles), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated: "Although Gaudet has never been overruled, its holding has
been limited over the years to the point that it is virtually meaningless."5' At
the other extreme, a district court within the Sixth Circuit, subsequently and with
54. Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 304 (1993).
[Vol. 55
ROBERT FORCE
full knowledge of this statement, concluded that "loss of consortium damages
remain viable under the general maritime law, except as specifically held
otherwise by Miles."55 This part Will review the impact of Miles on the lower
federal and state courts.
B. Dependent Spouses
Perhaps the simplest question for the courts to resolve is whether damages
for loss of consortium are recoverable in a wrongful death action brought by a
dependent spouse. Some plaintiffs have argued Miles is not controlling on this
issue because the plaintiff in Miles was a non-dependent parent.56  This
distinction was crucial and served as the basis for the decision of the court of
appeals in Miles on the loss of consortium issue.57 Prior to Miles, the depen-
dent/non-dependent distinction was regarded by many courts as the critical factor
in determining whether a parent could recover for loss of consortium.58
However, those courts that have been asked to draw this distinction in claims by
dependent spouses have rejected it on the ground that the Supreme Court in
Miles drew no such distinction, but simply held loss of consortium is not an
appropriate item of damages in wrongful death actions based on the death of a
seaman.59  In reaching this result, the Miles Court declined to follow the
reasoning of the court below which had relied on the distinction to deny
recovery.
C. Personal Injuries Not Resulting in Death
The courts have not had much difficulty determining whether the Miles
preclusion of recovery for loss of consortium in the case of the death of a
seaman also applies to a spouse's claim for loss of consortium against a
seaman's employer in a personal injury case in which no death occurred.
Seamen's suits against their employers frequently couple a Jones Act claim with
a claim for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. Every court of
55. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
56. Haltom v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 771 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Tex. 1991); Turley v. Co-Mar
Offshore Marine Corp., 766 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. La. 1991).
57. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 987 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990). This view, apparently, has been accepted by the courts
as being the majority view in both non-maritime and maritime death cases. Sistrunk v. Circle Bar
Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S. Ct. 1205 (1986);
Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
58. See Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1019, 106 S. Ct. 1205 (1986); Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151
(S.D. Fla. 1992). But see Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984)
(allowing the parents of an adult plane crash victim to collect for loss of love and companionship).
59. Haltom v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 771 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Tex. 1991); Turley v. Co-Mar
Offshore Marine Corp., 766 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. La. 1991).
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appeals and virtually every district court that has considered the consortium issue
in personal injury cases has held that Miles also precludes recovery for loss of
consortium in personal injury cases.' Some courts have relied heavily on the
uniformity ground of Miles.6' Others have found that the rationale, in such
cases prior to Miles, for allowing recovery has been eroded by Miles and,
furthermore, that the reliance by Miles on congressional intent to preclude loss
of consortium in actions under the Jones Act was equally applicable in personal
injury cases under the general maritime law. 62
D. Seamen's Actions Against Non-Employer Defendants
A quite different question deals with the applicability of Miles to actions
brought by seamen against non-employer defendants. In Miles, the Court placed
great emphasis on the incongruity between recovery by seamen under the Jones
Act, which has been held not to allow loss of consortium, and the Gaudet
formula which does allow such damages, at least in the case of "longshoremen"
(Sieracki seamen). To bring uniformity to seamen's actions, the Court in Miles
made the preclusive Jones Act rule applicable in a seaman's unseaworthiness
action against his employer as well. In suits against a non-employer shipowner
or any other actor who is not the seaman's employer, the Jones Act is not
applicable. The action is based exclusively on the general maritime law. Some
courts have found that Miles is nevertheless controlling, usually on grounds of
uniformity. 63 Other courts, however, have limited Miles to its facts and have
held that, where a seaman's claim is against a non-employer defendant (hence
not under the Jones Act) and is not brought under the DOHSA, the general
maritime law continues to provide a remedy for loss of consortium. In such
cases, not only is there no statutory bar, but there is no conflict with any
60. Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1994); Smith v. Trinadad Corp., 992 F.2d
996 (9th Cir. 1993); Lollie v. Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993); Michel v.
Total Transp.,.Inc., 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992); Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958
F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992); Gray v. Texaco, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1090 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 687 (1993); Phillips v. Water Towing, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1387 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1135 (1993).
61. See, e.g:, Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992).
62. See Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200(1st Cir. 1994); Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci
Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992); Cater v. Placid Oil Co., 760
F. Supp. 568 (E.D. La. 1991).
63. Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994); Trident Marine
v. M/V Atticos, Nos. CIV.A. 93-1018, 93-1070, 93-3116, 1994 WL 682469 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1994);
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Red Fox Indus., 813 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1993), affd in part, 18 F.3d
935 (5th Cir. 1994); Ellender v. John E. Graham & Co., 821 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. La. 1992);
Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. La. 1991); Billot v. Lovell, 633 So. 2d 280 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1993); Trahan v. Texaco, Inc., 625 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). Davis
involved a products liability suit against the manufacturer of a vessel. The court found the status of




statutory provision.' This split of authorities is probably attributable to the
manner in which the opinions of both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals discuss the liability of the various defendants. 65 The Supreme
64. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Sugden v. Puget
Sound Tug & Barge Co., 796 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Rebstock v. Sonat Offshore Drilling,
764 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991); Verdin v. L&M Bo-Truc Rental, Inc., No. CIV.A. 88-0308, 1991
WL 194764 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1992). The Rebstock court stated
that Jones Act status is irrelevant in an action against third parties. Rebstock, 764 F. Supp. at 75-76.
65. In Miles, the plaintiff sued numerous defendants, including Apex Marine Corporation and
Westchester Shipping Company (identified as "the vessel operators"), Archon Marine (identified in
the Supreme Court's opinion simply as "the charterer," but in the court of appeals' opinion as a
"bare-boat" charterer), and Aeron Marine Company (referred to as the "owner" of the vessel). Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 21, 111 S. Ct. 317, 320 (1990). A bare-boat charter under
certain circumstances may insulate the true owner from liability for unseaworthy conditions caused
or otherwise attributable to the charterer. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 248. But see Baker v.
Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 183 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981). That would appear to be so when the
unseaworthiness is based on some deficiency of the crew. In such cases the bare-boat charterer is
treated as the owner pro hac vice and is liable for unseaworthy conditions which cause injury to a
member of the crew. Ordinarily, the owner pro hac vice is considered an employer of the crew, but
this depends on the circumstances and the terms of the charter party. It is not clear from the facts
whether Apex and Westchester were the seaman's employer, whether they were merely agents for
the "owner" and therefore not the seaman's employer, or whether all three were the seaman's
employer. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the bare-boat charter was an arms-length transaction,
which should have insulated the true owner, or whether the charterer was some alter ego of the
owner. Finally, it is not clear whether the charterer took the master and crew of the owner
notwithstanding the statement that the charter was a bare-boat charter. The court of appeals stated
the plaintiff's decedent had been hired pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Apex
and the seaman's union. But neither court analyzed the discrete theories of liability applicable to
each defendant, and the Supreme Court lumped all of the defendants into a group it collectively
referred to as "Apex," thus seeming to treat all the defendants as one. This grouping and the manner
in which the Court worded its holding-"that there is no recovery for loss of society in a general
maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman," Miles, 498 U.S. at 33, 111 S. Ct. at
326-support an argument that the beneficiaries lost not only the right to recover loss of consortium
in unseaworthiness actions from a seaman's vessel-owner-employer but also from all defendants
against whom they assert a general maritime law claim. Conversely, it may be argued that because
the Court relied heavily in its analysis on congressional intent in enacting the FELA, the Jones Act,
and on its prior decisions as to the scope of damages in Jones Act cases, the Court merely wanted
to create a uniform rule of damages in actions founded on the seaman-employer relationship. Perhaps
it was in each of the Miles defendant's interest not to contest the issue whether it was a Jones Act
employer, because as a Jones Act employer it had the best argument for denying liability for loss of
consortium. This might explain why the issue was not discussed in either appellate decision.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have realized seamen sue tortfeasors other than their vessel-
owner employers, and the Court could have made the scope of its decision clearer. In the meantime,
the lower federal courts can only guess at whether the Miles preclusion of recovery for loss of
consortium applies in suits by seamen or their beneficiaries against defendants other than employers.
In fact, in Mussa v. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Mich. 1992), one of the defendants
sought to support its argument that Miles applies across the board to any action by or derived through
a seaman regardless of the defendant's status by placing before the court the pleadings in Miles. The
defendant's purpose was to show that plaintiffs had sued non-employer defendants, and that such
actions were included within the Supreme Court's holding in Miles. Id. at 89.
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Court simply lumped together all of the defendants (the owner, operator, and
charterer) and referred to them collectively as "Apex."6 The Fifth Circuit
focused on Miles' status as a non-dependent parent as the basis for denying
recovery, thereby finding it unnecessary to discuss the status of the various
defendants. The Supreme Court, however, relied heavily on the decedent's status
as a Jones Act seaman. As discussed below, the Court should have realized that
the status of the various defendants as either employers or non-employers could
be an important factor.
E. Non-Seamen Plaintiffs
Another question raised in some cases is whether the Court's holding in
Miles in regard to loss of consortium is applicable in cases in which the person
who has been injured or killed is not a seaman. The Court's specific reference
to the "death of a seaman ' 67 may have led some courts to conclude the Miles
rule is not applicable in cases involving a non-seaman. 68 Certainly, if the Court
had intended to formulate a rule of general applicability it could have overruled
Gaudet and indicated that recovery for loss of consortium is not available in any
action brought under the general maritime law. It did not indicate, however, that
it was overruling Gaudet. The following sections provide analyses of cases
involving injury or death of maritime workers such as longshoremen and cases
involving other persons.
66. Miles, 498 U.S. at 21, 111 S. Ct. at 320.
67. There are actually two holdings in regard to consortium, and in both the Court referred only
to the death of a seaman. Id. at 37, 111 S. Ct. at 328.
68. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1060 (1994) (relying partially on Miles and holding in a product liability suit that a non-dependent
parent of a child killed in a jet ski accident could recover neither for loss of consortium nor for the
future earnings of the decedent). But see Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 645 (3d Cir.
1994) (limiting Miles, in a wrongful death suit by the parents of a 12-year-old child killed in a
recreational boating accident, to classes of plaintiffs specifically addressed by Congress, and holding
that "whether loss of society, loss of support and services, future earnings or punitive damages are
available for the death of a non-seaman in territorial waters is a question to be decided in accordance
with state law").
This reasoning has also been followed in the Second Circuit in cases involving wrongful death
suits and survival actions stemming from fatal airline accidents. In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie
Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994), a case arising out of the air disaster over
Lockerbie, Scotland, the court found Miles only limited the recovery of those plaintiffs restricted by
statute (such as the Jones Act or the DOHSA) to pecuniary damages. Finding that the applicable
statute, the Warsaw Convention, meant to provide for "full compensatory damages for any injuries
or death covered by the Convention," the court held the measure of damages should be that allowed
by the general maritime law principles, and not by more restrictive federal statutes. Id. at 829.
Accord Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Nos. 542, 667, 93-7490, 93-7546, 1994 WL 685690 (2d Cir.
Dec. 5, 1994) (involving the crash of an airplane into the Sea of Japan).
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F. Actions by Maritime Workers
As to maritime workers, it should be noted that Gaudet involved an action
by a longshoreman whose claim was grounded on unseaworthiness under the
general maritime law. Congress has since abolished the longshoreman's action
for unseaworthiness; the question, thus, is whether Gaudet's holding has
survived. Although Gaudet was based on unseaworthiness, longshoremen and
other maritime workers may still bring actions for negligence under the general
maritime law against persons who injure them. This right is preserved and
modified in the LHWCA.69 Thus, notwithstanding the absence of an unseawor-
thiness remedy under the general maritime law, an action for negligence still
exists under the general maritime law. Gaudet held that damages recoverable
under an unseaworthiness action included loss of consortium. If Gaudet survived
Miles, then there is no reason why that remedy is not still available under a
general maritime law negligence action. As stated above, the Supreme Court did
not explicitly overrule Gaudet; although, with its concern for uniformity, it may
have severely undermined it. Some lower courts have concluded Gaudet cannot
be rationally applied in light of Miles.70 In compelling analyses, these courts
have noted that seamen have been a favored group in the courts.71 What
69. Section 905(b) of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA provides a cause of action for
negligence to a maritime worker under the Act. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). See also Hall v. Hvide Hull No. 3, 746 F.2d 294, 303 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Rosetti, 474 U.S. 820, 106 S. Ct. 69 (1985):
[T]he Congressional intent of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, including
that provided by § 905(b), was to preserve within the federal admiralty jurisdiction the
traditional maritime tort remedy of an Act-covered employee for injuries caused by the
negligence of a vessel, broadly defined, while on the navigable waters.
70. Several judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana have so held. See, e.g., Means v.
Tidewater Grand Isle, Inc., No. CIV.A. 92-1589, 1993 WL 149073 (E.D. La. May 6, 1993);
Boudreaux v. Penrod Drilling Corp., No. CIV.A. 91-2660, 1993 WL 30344 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1993);
Hollie v. Consolidated Natural Gas Serv. Co., No. CIV.A. 91-0608, 1993 WL 22191 (E.D. La. Jan.
21, 1993). Each of these cases was decided before the Fifth Circuit decided Randall v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 1994), which held to the contrary. Cf. Robertson v. Arco Oil &
Gas Co., 766 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. La.) (involving a plaintiff who was an oil and gas worker and who
was injured on the continental shelf), aff'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991). In
Smallwood v. American Trading & Transp. Co., 839 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the court,
basing its analysis on the development of remedies for longshoremen "and the Supreme Court's clear
language in Miles," held "that Gaudet damages are no longer recoverable by the survivors of
longshore workers injured or killed in territorial waters." The court then concluded, based on its
reading of the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA (in regard to compensa-
tion), that Congress intended to put longshoremen "on the same footing as land based employees"
and that state law should determine damages recoverable under the Act. 'Id. The court allowed
recovery for loss of consortium under California law. Id. So much for uniformity!
71. Seamen receive preferential treatment with regard to wages. See Thielebeule v. M/S
Nordsee Pilot, 452 F.2d 1230, 1232 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Congress has looked with great favor upon
[wage claim suits] ... and has granted seamen preferential treatment over other litigants in
admiralty." (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 72 S. Ct. 1011 (1952))); Cummings v.
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justification could there be for courts to extend greater rights to longshoremen
than to seamen? If uniformity in damages is a driving force in the Miles
decision, is uniformity not promoted by applying the Miles rule to all maritime
personal injury and death cases? Some courts have so concluded. 2 Others,
including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Miles has not
overruled Gaudet and that damages for loss of consortium may be awarded
where a longshoreman has been killed in territorial waters.73 The Fifth Circuit,
however, has also held that damages for loss of consortium may not be recovered
where a longshoreman is injured outside of territorial waters.74 Gaudet is
controlling only with respect to injuries sustained by a longshoreman within
territorial waters.
G. Actions by Persons Other Than Seamen and Maritime Workers
There is a split of authority as to whether damages for loss of consortium
may be awarded in cases involving injury to or death of persons such as
passengers who are neither seamen nor maritime workers. Some courts have
interpreted the uniformity dimension of Miles as having eliminated recovery for
loss of consortium in actions under the general maritime law regardless of the
status of the parties.75  For example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Miller Time, 705 F. Supp. 62, 65 (D.P.R. 1988) ("Securing such a right to fishermen ... follows
from the special position seamen hold as wards of the admiralty court .... Fishermen and other
seamen receive special treatment from the courts, including with regard to their wages."). Courts
have treated seamen favorably in terms of a shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure. See
Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Fla. 1987) ("The rule [for maintenance and
cure] has been liberally applied in favor of the seaman."); Oswalt v. Williamson Towing Co., 357
F. Supp. 304, 310 (N.D. Miss. 1973) ("Admiralty courts have been liberal in interpreting this duty
[to provide for maintenance and cure] 'for the benefit and protection of seamen who are its wards.'"
(quoting Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531-32, 82 S. Ct. 997, 1000 (1962) and Calmar S.S.
Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528, 58 S. Ct. 651, 653 (1938))), aff'd in part, 488 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.
1974). Also, statutes have been liberally construed by the courts in favor of seamen. See Zarrago
v. Texas Co., 182 F. Supp. 589, 592 (E.D. Pa.) ("The libellants rely primarily upon the history of
favored treatment to seamen in the construction of these statutes to support their contentions. This
court agrees with the policy expressed in these cases .... (citations omitted)), affd, 284 F.2d 657
(3d Cir. 1960). See also Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime
Law?, 24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 249, 283-84 (1993).
72. See supra note 70.
73. Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 1994). The court determined the
LHWCA, which preserves a longshoreman's general maritime negligence action, does not limit
recovery to pecuniary loss as the Jones Act and the DOHSA do. See also Ferrara v. Fukuoka
Senpaku, K.K., No. CIV.A. 88-346-S, 1991 WL 50040 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 1991), which reached the
same result.
74. Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119 (5th Cir. 1994). And see McKee v.
Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-3848, 1994 WL 382633 (E.D. La. July 19, 1984),
which reached the same result for a roustabout injured outside of territorial waters.
75. Newhouse v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Nev. 1994) (limiting passenger damages
under Moragne to pecuniary losses).
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Appeals has suggested that it would be inconsistent with Miles to allow recovery
for loss of consortium in a death case arising from a collision on an inland
waterway between plaintiff-decedent's bass boat and a crew boat operated by
defendant. Neither the Jones Act nor unseaworthiness was involved.76 The
case was one of pure general maritime law negligence, but the court stated "[tihe
Supreme Court has clearly indicated its desire to achieve uniformity of damage
recoveries in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction."77 The court further stated
that "with out [sic] expressly so deciding at this time, we acknowledge the
strength of the argument that damages for loss of society may no longer be
permitted in a general maritime wrongful death action involving the operator of
a fishing boat. 7 8 In contrast, some courts have held that Miles does not extend
to cases based on injury or death of a non-seaman. Recovery has been allowed
in cases involving passengers, 79 and also in one case involving a swim-
76. Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993). Also see dictum in Robertson v. Arco Oil
& Gas Co., 766 F. Supp. 535, 539 (W.D. La.), aff'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991),
where the court said:
Thus, the same damages principles applicable to seamen bringing general maritime law
claims ... apply equally to longshoremen's actions under 905(b). As no other ability to
recover loss of consortium damages in a general maritime tort action exists, the court can
discern no reason to provide for such here. It must be remembered that the section 905(b)
action is merely an action for maritime negligence, indistinguishable from an action by
passengers of or visitors on a ship.
(emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit further indicated it would apply Miles in a passenger situation in Kelly v. Panama
Canal Comm'n, 26 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994). In this case, suit was brought under the Panama Canal
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3772 (1988); however, in denying recovery for loss of consortium to the spouse of
the decedent boat passenger, the court relied on maritime law and applied the Miles preclusive rule.
The Ninth Circuit has applied Miles to preclude recovery for loss of consortium in the case of a
passenger injured on the high seas. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
77. Walker, 995 F.2d at 82.
78. Id. On remand, the district court denied recovery for loss of consortium on grounds of
uniformity, and because it believed it would be "anomalous" to allow the beneficiaries of a non-
seaman to recover damages which were denied to the beneficiaries of a seaman. Walker v. Braus,
861 F. Supp. 527, 535 (E.D. La. 1994). Compare Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888 (5th
Cir. 1994), which is the Fifth Circuit's decision with respect to longshoremen.
79. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994); Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903
(9th Cir. 1994); Emery v. Rock Island Boatyards, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114 (C.D. Ill. 1994); Powers v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 855 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. Mich. 1994). Emery involved the survivors of
deceased pleasure boat passengers. See also In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21,
1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Nos. 542, 667, 93-7480, 93-7546,
1994 WL 685690 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has read Miles as not
precluding recovery of loss of consortium in all general maritime cases, but following what appears
to be the majority view has held that loss of consortium can be recovered only by dependent parents
of a deceased non-seaman. Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has held, where the Jones Act and the DOHSA do not apply, a non-
dependent parent may not recover loss of consortium for the death of a child. The "non-dependency"
of the parent seems to have been a crucial factor because, even before the Miles decision, the clear
weight of the case law denied loss of consortium to non-dependent parents. Although not expressly
stated, the implication is such recovery would be allowed if the parent could show financial
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mer. ° These courts have emphasized that no statute is controlling in these
situations and that, because non-seaman plaintiffs are not entitled to invoke the
benefits of the Jones Act, these plaintiffs should not be subject to the Act's
restrictions on damages.
H. Lost Future Wages in Survival Actions
The second issue addressed by the Court in Miles dealt with whether
damages for future lost wages, that is, income the plaintiffs decedent would
have earned if he had not been killed, may be recovered by his estate in a
survival action. Again, the Court first considered a preliminary issue: whether
it should create a survival action under the general maritime law, as some lower
courts had done. 8' The Court, however, declined to resolve the issue, preferring
instead to hold that, even if it were to recognize such an action, recovery for
future lost wages would not be recoverable. Initially, the Court pointed out that,
in states which permit survival actions, the majority rule precludes recovery for
future lost wages.82 But the Court felt itself foreclosed from considering, let
alone adopting, the minority rule, even if it were inclined to do so: "We sail in
occupied waters. Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute and we
are not free to expand remedies at will simply because it might work to the
benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them. 8 3 The Court then observed
that, at the time the Jones Act was enacted, the survival provision of the FELA
had been interpreted as precluding recovery for loss of future wages and that this
rule was equally applicable to the Jones Act. "Congress has limited the survival
right for seamen's injuries resulting from negligence." 84 As with the loss of
consortium issue, the Court was unwilling to provide a broader remedy under the
general maritime law.
Also, questions again arise as to the consequences of the Court's decision
on the "loss wages" issue. Does the exclusion of future lost wages from
recovery in a survival action apply in suits brought against defendants other than
the decedent seaman's employer where the Jones Act is inapplicable and
dependency. Otherwise, the distinction between dependent and non-dependent parents would be
superfluous. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1060 (1994). Accord Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla.
1992). Both cases involved fatal jet ski accidents.
80. Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.C. 1994).
81. Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S. Ct. 261 (1987);
Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.,
742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas
M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972).
82. The Court noted it was not bound by the majority rule and mentioned there were policy
reasons that favored the minority rule, including the "special solicitude for the welfare of seamen and
their families." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36, 111 S. Ct. 317, 327 (1990).
83. Id.
84. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 328.
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Congress cannot be said to have limited the seaman's remedy? 85 Does the
exclusion of post-death lost wages from recovery in a survival action apply in
cases involving non-seamen decedents such as maritime workers or passen-
gers? 6 One may anticipate conflicts within the lower courts similar to those
that have occurred with regard to the loss of consortium issue. In denying
recovery to non-dependent parents whose son had died in a jet ski accident, the
Second Circuit Court of.Appeals remarked that the Supreme Court's holding on
the lost wages issue was much broader than its holding on loss of consortium.87
The court of appeals stated that, although the Miles Court "relied heavily upon
the decedent's status as a seaman and the resultant applicability of the Jones Act,
... the announced conclusion of its opinion (unlike the companion ruling on loss
of society) was not confined to seamen."8 However, that interpretation of the
breadth of Miles on the lost wages issue may be reading the Court's concluding
sentence both too literally and out of context, because almost everything else the
Court said on the lost wages issue was in the context of the death of a
seaman.
89
85. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that Miles overruled its previous holding that future
lost wages of a seaman could be recovered in a general maritime law survival action. It has also
held, in a case involving a seaman killed on the high seas, that the Miles rule precluding recovery
of lost future wages was applicable even where suit is not based on the Jones Act and where the
defendant is not the decedent's employer. As the court held in Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding &
Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1994): "Miles instructs the lower federal courts that a claim
for lost future earnings is not available in connection with a maritime death for which Congress has
already provided a remedy and has excluded such damages. The identity of the defendant is
irrelevant to these considerations."
86. Newhouse v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Nev. 1994) (relying on the expansive
language of Miles and disallowing recovery for future economic loss for the death of a passenger);
Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993) (relying on the need for
uniformity, the Jones Act, and the DOHSA and disallowing recovery for, future lost wages for the
death of a passenger and for loss of future enjoyment of life).
87. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1060 (1994).
88. Id at 1093. But see Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 639 n.31 (3d Cir.
1994):
[E]ven if there is a federal rule which extends beyond seamen ... we doubt that the
federal rule would extend to deny lost future earnings when the decedent was a child....
We also doubt its applicability to cases where the decedent was an adult who, unlike a
Jones Act seaman, was unemployed.
89. The Court framed the issue to be decided this way: "We must next decide whether, in a
general maritime action surviving the death of a seaman, the estate can recover decedent's lost future
earnings." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33, 111 S. Ct. 317, 326 (1990). Later, the
Court said:
We will not create, under our admiralty powers, a remedy disfavored by a clear majority
of the States and that goes well beyond the limits of Congress' ordered system of recovery
for seamen's injury and death. Because Torregano's estate cannot recover for his lost
future income under the Jones Act, it cannot do so under general maritime law.
Id. at 36, 111 S. Ct. at 328.
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1. Punitive Damages
In light of the current controversy over punitive damages throughout tort
law, it should come as no surprise that the Miles decision has been cast into the
fray notwithstanding that, not only did the Supreme Court not decide whether
punitive damages are recoverable under the general maritime law, but the term
"punitive damages" is never discussed in its opinion. 90 It should also come as
no surprise that the lower federal courts are divided on the issue of whether
punitive damages are recoverable under the general maritime law after Miles.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First9' and the Sixth92 Circuits
have held that, under Miles, punitive damages may not be recovered in a claim
under the general maritime law. Both cases involved injury to or death of a
seaman. 93  Based upon Miles, two themes run through these decisions on
punitive damages and those of district courts that have reached similar results-a
desire for uniformity and deference to legislative determinations. 94 These courts
90. The Supreme Court, in summarizing the history of the Miles case in the lower courts,
mentioned that a claim for punitive damages was dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the
court of appeals. Id. at 22-23, 111 S. Ct. at 320.
91. Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 203 (1st Cir. 1994).
92. Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1459 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 304 (1993).
93. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue in a case involving a non-
seaman decedent, but resolved it by holding punitive damages could not be recovered by non-
dependent parents. In passing, however, the court referred, with apparent approval, to lower federal
court cases which, relying on Miles, disallowed punitive damages under the general maritime law "in
order to further uniformity between that law and the analogous federal statutes." Wahlstrom v.
Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1094 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S,
822 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Va. 1993)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994). See Ortega v. Oceantrawl,
Inc., 822 F. Supp. 621 (D. Alaska 1992); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.
Mich. 1992). See also the cases cited in CEH, Inc. v. FV "Seafarer", 148 F.R.D. 469 (D.R.I. 1993),
affd, 153 F.R.D. 491 (D.R.I. 1994). CEH, Inc. did, however, allow a claim for punitive damages
where no statutory claim had been made. The decision in that case was originally entered by a
magistrate judge and was later affirmed by the district court.
94. In addition to the cases cited supra note 93, see Ledet v. Power Offshore Servs., No.
CIV.A. 93-4204, 1994 WL 150805 (E.D. La. Apr. 6, 1994) (disallowing punitive damages under
general maritime personal injury law but allowing them for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay
maintenance and cure); Anderson v Texaco, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1992) (disallowing
punitive damages under general maritime personal injury law but allowing them for willful refusal
to pay maintenance and cure); La Voie v. Kualoa Ranch & Activity Club, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 827 (D.
Haw. 1992) (holding Miles precludes punitive damages both on the unseaworthiness claim and the
willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure); Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 943
(D.R.I. 1991) (disallowing punitive damages for a pecuniary loss); Bridgett v. Odeco, Inc., 646 So.
2d 1249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (holding, after Miles, punitive damages are not available under the
general maritime law); Gray v. Texaco, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1090 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (holding Miles
precludes recovery of punitive damages even for willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure), writ
denied, 616 So. 2d 687 (1993). See also Guillory v. C.F. Bean Corp., No. CIV.A. 93-2643, 1994
WL 150738 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1994); Dopson v. Wilrig, No. CIV.A. 92-4091, 1993 WL 192145
(E.D. La. June 1, 1993); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. La. 1992); In re
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have noted that the Jones Act incorporates the substantive provisions of the
FELA and, as such, punitive damages are not recoverable in Jones Act cases.
95
Interspersed in the discussions is the suggestion that the FELA and the Jones Act
allow only for the recovery of "pecuniary" losses, and that punitive damages are
"non-pecuniary."'  This analysis has led some courts to conclude that the
general maritime law must respect the limits for recovery established by
Congress and that courts should not create a right to recover damages that exceed
the congressionally mandated limits.97 These courts have remarked that the
strong interest in uniformity in maritime law also supports this result. Almost
all of the cases have involved seamen and their employers, but some have
involved non-employer defendants.98
As has occurred in post-Miles loss of consortium cases, defendants can be
expected to use the reasoning in Miles to resist the claims for punitive damages
asserted in cases involving non-seamen, to wit, if uniformity is important in
harmonizing damages recoverable in seamen cases under the general maritime
law with those recoverable under the Jones Act and the DOHSA, is it not equally
important to harmonize the damages recoverable under the general maritime law
in non-seamen cases with those recoverable in seamen cases? The general
maritime law has shown special solicitude to seamen and their families. To treat
non-seamen and their families more favorably than seamen and their families
would be anomalous and contrary to the history and tradition of maritime law.
Thus, there are logical arguments for extending the scope of Miles.
Other courts have rejected this approach and have concluded that Miles is
not determinative of the punitive damages issue. In the most direct approach,
some courts have simply found Miles not to be controlling because the punitive
damages issue was not before the Court and was not discussed by the Court even
Aleutian Enter., Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., No. CIV.A. 90-0163, 1991 WL 129808 (E.D. La. July 10, 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 974 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1992); Haltom v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 771 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Tex.
1991); In re The Mardoc, 768 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams,
868 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1993).
95. Decisions under the FELA have held punitive damages are not recoverable. Kozar v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971). Likewise, some courts have concluded no
claim for punitive damages may be made under the Jones Act. Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742
F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
96. "In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Supreme Court held that non-pecuniary damages are
not recoverable under General Maritime Law or the Jones Act. Punitive damages, by their nature,
are non-pecuniary." Bell v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 855 F. Supp. 152, 153 (W.D. La. 1994) (citation
omitted).
97. To say that Miles should be strictly limited to its facts is to ignore the doctrinal
underpinnings of the decision. Miles compels the conclusion that a plaintiff who is statutorily
barred from receiving a punitive award cannot recover punitive damages by couching his claim
in the judge-made general maritime law of negligence and unseaworthiness.
Anderson v. Texaco, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. La. 1992).
98. Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 943 (D.R.I. 1991) (involving a claim for
punitive damages against employer and non-employer defendants).
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in dictum. These courts, then, have relied on pre-Miles decisions which have
allowed punitive damages in actions brought under the general maritime law. 99
J. Forecasting the Future-Part 1 Miles: What Could Have Been
As things stand, some courts have read Miles literally and have confined the
decision to its facts: a Jones Act seaman's dependents cannot recover damages
for loss of consortium from his Jones Act employer even in an action under the
general maritime law; and, in calculating damages in survival actions, loss of
future wages may not be included. On the other hand, what appears to be a
majority of courts has pointed out that a fair reading of the Miles' opinion and,
more particularly, a fair regard for the reasons given by the Court for reaching
its conclusion, would compel the extension of the Miles restrictive approach to
other damages issues which were not before the Court. The two doctrines which
underlie the decision in Miles are uniformity and judicial deference to congres-
sional mandate. Did these two doctrines compel the result in Miles, and do they
necessitate the extension of Miles to matters not before the Court in that case?
These important issues will be examined now.
99. Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. La. 1991) (involving no Jones Act claim,
but only a general maritime negligence claim against a non-employer). The Duplantis court relied
on pre-Miles Fifth Circuit precedent in a personal injury case, In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d
622 (5th Cir. 1981), and in the seminal case The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 546 (1818),
which was a non-personal injury collision case. See also Powers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 855 F.
Supp. 199 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (allowing punitive damages in an action brought by a passenger);
CEH, Inc. v. FV "Seafarer", 148 F.R.D. 469 (D.R.I. 1993), aff'd, 153 F.R.D. 491 (D.R.I. 1994)
(allowing punitive damages where no statutory claim has been asserted); Kartofilis v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp., No. CIV.A. 92-3397, 92-3352, 1993 WL 483576 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1993) (sustaining
dismissal of punitive damages against the Jones Act employer but not against an allegedly negligent
third party); Mussa v. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (allowing punitive
damages from third party against whom no statutory claim had been asserted); Hannon v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., No. CIV.A. 80-1175, 1991 WL 278996 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1991) (involving Jones Act
and general maritime claims against a Jones Act employer); Davis v. Penrod Drilling Corp., No.
CIV.A. 91-1458, 1991 WL 26451 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1991) (involving an unseaworthiness claim
against a Jones Act employer); Butler v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 633 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1994) (involving Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims against an employer); Strawder v. Zapata
Haynie Corp., Nos. 94-453, 94-454, 1994 WL 597489 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1994) (holding in
a suit against a non-employer third party that Miles only restricts recovery of "compensatory" non-
pecuniary damages, not "exemplary" remedies such as punitive damages); Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc.,
609 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (allowing punitive damages in an unseaworthiness action
against employer.). Kartofilis was decided by the same judge who decided Duplantis.
Similarly, in a post-Miles case concerning the availability of punitive damages for failure to pay
maintenance and cure, the Fifth Circuit distinguished maintenance and cure from other remedies
available to seamen (such as those under the DOHSA and the Jones Act) and found the "implications
of Miles... are not so direct as to allow this panel to depart from the Court's previous decisions that
punitive damages are available in maintenance and cure cases." Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
34 F.3d 1279, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc granted, No. 92-4711 (Nov. 4, 1994). However,
an appeal for rehearing en banc has been granted.
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K Uniformity
It is quite commonly observed that one of the goals of admiralty law is
uniformity.'" To the extent this has been achieved, it is one of the virtues of
admiralty law. Persons engaged in interstate and international transportation
should not have to be exposed to different-rules as their vessels move from place
to place. However, as has been observed elsewhere, uniformity is most
important in commercial transactions because it enables business persons to plan
and calculate the consequences of their actions.'" This is true not only in the
matter of maritime transactions but also in the land-based law of contracts,
negotiable instruments, etc. This quest for uniformity in the commercial world
has prompted Congress and the states to adopt legislation such as the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act'02 and the Uniform Commercial Code.
0 3
Be that as it may, one must recognize that maritime personal injury and
death laws have always been characterized by substantial differences, often based
upon such factors as the status of the parties.' ° As stated at the outset of this
paper, only a seaman may bring an action for maintenance and cure and for
unseaworthiness. Maritime workers and passengers may not bring such an
action. A seaman may sue his employer for negligence, but a maritime worker
ordinarily may not. The element of negligence under the Jones Act is different
than that under the general maritime law. The element of causation is different
under the Jones Act than it is under the general maritime law, such as in an
unseaworthiness action. Although a longshoreman may sue a vessel owner for
negligence, special rules have been formulated to define the vessel owner's duty
of care. This lack of uniformity is not merely the product of judicial activity, but
is often compelled by legislation such as the Jones Act and the LHWCA.
Furthermore, these differences do not concern inconsequential details. One may
express the view that whether a plaintiff may recover damages for loss of
consortium is of considerably less significance than whether a plaintiff has a
100. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, I Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-2, at 60 (2d ed.
1994).
101. Michael F. Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in
Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1251, 1265-74 (1989).
102. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). This statute is based on an international convention
intended to promote uniformity.
103. In contrast, personal injury law is one area that has characteristically varied to some degree
from state to state, and there has never been the same perceived need for uniformity in this area as
there has been in the area of commercial law. See, e.g., Sturley, supra note 101.
104. See supra notes 1-29 and accompanying text. One recent Third Circuit case, Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994), indicates the Miles nods in the direction of
uniformity are somewhat disingenuous. Noting one trend in recent Supreme Court cases is "the
weakness with which the principle of uniformity.., has actually been applied," the court opined that
"the concept of uniformity has a good deal less weight than has been thought," and that its
significance lies only in "the extent that it aids in the 'vindication of federal policies."' Id. at 636-37
(citations omitted). Furthermore, the court's interpretation of Miles led it to conclude status is not
irrelevant in determining the availability of damages that "status does make a difference." Id.
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cause of action at all. But if uniformity is so important as to require a denial of
damages to a seaman's spouse for her loss of consortium, it would seem that an
even more compelling argument can be made for harmonizing the basic rules of
liability. Yet no such attempt is being undertaken. We should not, however,
slavishly pursue the goal of uniformity in a narrow context. There are other
important policy implications and historical factors that should be given
consideration.
The policy of achieving uniformity can be viewed in different contexts. The
Miles Court chose to view the uniformity goal only in the most narrow context
of the damage components of various kinds of seamen's actions. There is
another context in which the Court could have viewed damages. It could have
examined the issue by looking at the contemporary law of tort damages,
specifically recovery for loss of consortium as it presently exists in the United
States. During the last twenty years, there has been a major change with respect
to the recovery of damages for loss of consortium in American tort law.10 5
As late as 1963, in Igneri v. CIE. de Transports Oceaniques,'° the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue whether the wife of an injured
longshoreman could recover damages for loss of her husband's consortium. The
injuries occurred on a vessel in the harbor at Brooklyn, New York. At the time,
New York law did not provide a wife with a right to recover damages for loss
of consortium resulting from injuries to her husband. That New York law did
not recognize such a claim, observed Judge Friendly, was not dispositive because
maritime law was controlling. He also stated that, when there was no established
rule of maritime law, "admiralty judges often look to the law prevailing on the
land."'"1 The court then noted that at common law, and until recently in the
states, a wife had no right to recover damages for loss of consortium.
105. "In most jurisdictions today the loss of consortium action has been extended to a wife
whose husband has been negligently injured." Pamela R. Bollweg, Loss of Parental Consortium:
An Argument in Favor of Recognition in South Dakota, 38 S.D. L. Rev. 542, 542 (1993). See also
Edward E. Gainor, The Bucks Stop Here: Parents May Not Recover for Loss of Consortium of a
Negligently Injured Child: Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 422 N.W.2d 666 (1988), 5 Cooley
L. Rev. 811, 815 (1988) ("The wife's consortium action for negligent injury to the husband was first
recognized in 1950 .... This is now clearly the majority rule."); Kevin Lindsey, A More Equitable
Approach to Loss of Spousal Consortium, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 713 (1990) ("Over time the nature
of the action and the class of persons entitled to assert the claim changed considerably."); Michael
A. Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's Action for Loss of
Parental Consortium, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1321, 1332-33 (1992) ("Today, the overwhelming number of
jurisdictions allow both the husband and the wife to recover for loss of spousal consortium.").
Finally, see Gregg A. Guthrie, Comment, Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss
of Parental Consortium?, 28 Duq. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1990):
Until comparatively recently, however, there was no similar action in favor of a wife
when her husband was injured. It was not until 1950, in Hitaffer v. Argonne, Co., that
an American Court allowed a wife to recover for loss of consortium. Today, a majority
of American Courts allow the loss of consortium claim to either spouse ....
106. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963).
107. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, at the time of Igneri, only twelve American jurisdictions recognized
a wife's right to recover for loss of her husband's consortium, and nineteen states
that had reconsidered the issue since 1950 continued to reject it. In light of this
conflict, with only a minority of states recognizing a wife's right to recover
damages for loss of her husband's consortium, the court looked at the precedents
in maritime law. It found only a few old cases in which a husband's claim for
loss of his wife's consortium was in issue and none of these was considered as
sufficiently authoritative. Judge Friendly then made the same FELA-Jones Act
analysis later used in Miles and concluded that damages for loss of consortium
were not recoverable in an action for injury or death of a seaman under the Jones
Act. Likewise, a claim for loss of consortium under an unseaworthiness claim
should be controlled by the result in a Jones Act negligence claim. There is
nothing to indicate that the warranty of seaworthiness extends to third persons
such as a wife, especially in view of the strict liability nature of the claim. The
court could find no justification for giving more extensive damages in a strict
liability claim than one based on fault."0 8
It is important to note the Igneri decision viewed the loss of consortium
issue in a very broad context. It looked not merely at the Jones Act and the few
maritime precedents available but placed considerable emphasis on the fact that
loss of consortium was not readily available to wives in the United States. Ten
years after Igneri, the loss of consortium issue was considered by the Supreme
Court in Gaudet. In reaching its conclusion to allow a wife to recover damages
for loss of consortium in an action under the general maritime law, a majority
of the Court relied on the fact that "[a] clear majority of States ... have rejected
such a narrow view of damages, and, either by express statutory provision or by
judicial construction, permit recovery for loss of society."' 9 In a footnote the
majority opinion stated "that 27 of the 44 state and territorial wrongful-death
statutes which measure damages by the loss sustained by the beneficiaries, permit
recovery for loss of society."" It is precisely this kind of data, relied on by
the Igneri court to deny recovery in the 1960's and by the Gaudet Court to
permit recovery in the 1970's, which is absent in Miles. In other words, both the
Igneri and Gaudet courts seem to have recognized a need to reconcile the
elements of damages recoverable in maritime personal injury cases with those
recoverable in similar land-based cases. Why should maritime plaintiffs recover
108. Note, however, that in 1979 the New York Court of Appeals had to decide whether or not.
to follow Igneri. It refused to do so:
In our opinion, examination of the ratio decendendi of the Igneri decision reveals an
erosion of its theoretical underpinnings so severe as to precipitate its collapse under its
own weight. To begin with, unlike the state of the law of the land as to recovery for loss
of consortium then prevailing, the great majority of States, including New York, now
recognize such a cause of action by either husband or wife in a personal injury action.
Alvez v. American Export Lines, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 461, 463 (N.Y. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 274, 100
S. Ct. 1673 (1980) (citing numerous authorities).
109. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587, 94 S. Ct. 806, 816 (1974).
110. Id. at 588 n.21, 94 S. Ct. at 816 n.21.
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less damages than persons injured on the land? Maritime law generally has been
particularly solicitous to seamen and maritime workers and their families. There
is certainly no basic principle of maritime law that is hostile to or which would
be violated by allowing recovery for loss of consortium.
The Court in Miles, however, has laid the analytical framework for
eliminating recovery of loss of consortium in all maritime cases, perhaps for
eliminating the unseaworthiness action itself. Unless Miles is confined to its
facts, it will have achieved the narrow objective of making maritime personal
injury and death law uniform on the issue of loss of consortium, while retaining
a lack of uniformity on other more important issues of maritime personal injury
law. Furthermore, this result will have been achieved at the expense of creating
a lack of uniformity between maritime tort law and land-based tort law. It is
difficult to find any compelling difference between torts committed on water and
those committed on land that justifies disparate treatment of recovery of damages
for loss of consortium. The Court's decision in Miles, especially if it is extended
to all maritime personal injury actions and to other elements of damages, such
as punitive damages, can be expected to encourage forum shopping, as plaintiffs'
counsel now have an added incentive to narrow their "views" of admiralty tort
jurisdiction and to seek remedies under state tort law.
If the Miles Court had considered the current status of recovery for loss of
consortium in the United States, it would have found that virtually every state
allows a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium for the injury..'
111. Alabama: Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 304 So. 2d 881 (Ala. 1974); Alaska:
Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); Arizona: City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d
803 (Ariz. 1972); Arkansas: Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. V.W. Miller, 299 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1957);
Colorado: Crouch v. West, 477 P.2d 805 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Connecticut: Hopson v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 408 A.2d 260 (Conn. 1979); Delaware: Stenta v. Leblang, 185 A.2d 759 (Del. 1962); Florida:
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Georgia: Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.
Ga. 1978); Hawaii: Lealaimatafao v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 867 P.2d 220 (Haw. 1994);
Illinois: Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (III. 1960); Indiana: England v. Dana Corp., 428 F.2d 385
(7th Cir. 1970); Iowa: Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956); Kentucky: Lloyd v. Lloyd,
479 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1972); Maine: McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 472 A.2d 411 (Me. 1984);
Massachusetts: Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973); Minnesota: Dawydowycz
v. Quady, 220 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1974); Mississippi: Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So. 2d 13 (Miss.
1974); Missouri: Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Montana: Duffy
v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Nebraska: Guyton v. Solomon
Dehydrating Co., 302 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1962); Nevada: General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366
(Nev. 1972); New Hampshire: Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19 (N.H. 1984); New
Jersey: Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 215 A.2d I (N.J. 1965); New Mexico: Roseberry
v Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321 (N.M. 1963); New York: Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239
N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968); North Carolina: Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 266
S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980); North Dakota: Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal Order
* of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976); Ohio: Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc.,
258 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 1970); Oklahoma: Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.
1974); Oregon: Roe v. Pierce, 832 P.2d 1226 (Or. 1992); Pennsylvania: Hopkins v. Blanco, 320
A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974); Rhode Island: Mariani v. Nanni, 185 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1962); South Carolina:
Berry v. Myrick, 194 S.E.2d 240 (S.C. 1973); South Dakota: Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669
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and the death 1 2 of her husband. The Court would have found that the
trend in recent years has been to expand the right to recover damages for
loss of society to include not only wives and children" '  but also
(S.D. 1959); Tennessee: Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); Texas: Whittlesey
v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978); Vermont: Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt.
1985); Washington: Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 614 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1980); West Virginia: King
v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1976); Wisconsin: Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp.
Co., 234 N.W.2d 332 (Wis. 1975); Wyoming: Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986);
District of Columbia: Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1982); Puerto Rico:
Gonzalez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974); Guam: Duenas v. Yama's
Co., No. CIV. 90-00062A, No. S.C. Civ., No. CV0718-89, 1991 WL 255834 (D. Guam App. Div.
Nov. 18, 1991), affid, 999 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1993); Virgin Islands: Benjamin v. Cleburne Truck
& Body Sales, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1294 (D.V.I. 1976).
112. Alabama: Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 304 So. 2d 881 (Ala. 1974); Alaska: Alaska
Stat. § 09.55.580(c)(4) (1994); Arizona: Howard Frank M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955
(Ariz. 1986); Arkansas: Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n v. Garrett, 804 S.W.2d 711 (Ark. 1991); California:
Pesce v. Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Colorado: MacMaster v. Coontz,
623 P.2d 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-555(a) to -555(b)
(West 1991); Florida: Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Georgia: Aretz
v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Ga. 1978); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 663-3 (1988);
Illinois: Pfeifer v. Canyon Constr. Co., 628 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Indiana: Dearborn
Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990); Iowa: Audubon-Exira Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1904
(1983); Kentucky: Lloyd v. Lloyd, 479 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1972); Louisiana: La. Civ. Code art.
2315.1; Maine: Phillips v. Eastern Me. Medical Ctr., 565 A.2d 306 (Me. 1989); Maryland: Md.
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (1989); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2
(West 1994); Hallett v. Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. 1986); Michigan: Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.2922 (West 1986); Minnesota: Roers v. Engebretson, 479 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.090 (Vernon 1988); Montana: Swanson v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 646 P.2d 1166 (Mont. 1982); Nebraska: Anson v. Fletcher, 220 N.W.2d 371 (Neb.
1974); Nevada: Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moya, 837 P.2d 426 (Nev. 1992); New Jersey: Sykes
v. Propane Power Corp., 541 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); New Mexico: Romero v.
Byers, 872 P.2d 840 (N.M. 1994); New York: Ciaccio v. Housman, 42 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979); North Carolina: Keys v. Duke Univ., 435 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); North
Dakota: Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.02
(Baldwin 1994); Oklahoma: Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 857 P.2d 65 (Okla. 1993);
Oregon: Roe v. Pierce, 832 P.2d 1226 (Or. 1992); Pennsylvania: Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 619 A.2d
1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Rhode Island: Cobe v. Hersey, 576 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 1990); South
Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-75-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991); Tennessee: Kilboume v. Hanzelik, 648
S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); Texas: Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Dawson, 662 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983); Vermont: Clymer v. Webster, 596 A.2d 905 (Vt. 1991); Virginia: Basham v. Terry, 102
S.E.2d 285 (Va. 1958); Washington: Christie v. Maxwell, 696 P.2d 1256 (Wash. Ct. App.), review
denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1002 (1985); West Virginia: Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990);
Wisconsin: Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Wyoming: Weaver
v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986); District of Columbia: Romer v. District of Columbia, 449
A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1982); Puerto Rico: LaForest v. Autoridad de Las Fuentes Fluviales de P.R., 536
F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1976).
113. See the cases supra notes 111-112. See also the following cases, which deal exclusively
with recovery by children: Alaska: Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska
1987); Arizona: Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); Iowa: Weitl v.
Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), overruled on other grounds by Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc.
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parents.' 4 In other words, while the states have been swimming up the
consortium stream, the Supreme Court in Miles elected to go in the opposite
direction. Interestingly, the Court did look to the current view in the United
States on the future lost wages issue, and it used the prevailing view to buttress
its conclusion that such lost wages are not recoverable in a survival action."'
It is curious that the Court was willing to give some weight to the clear majority
view when that view supported its conclusion, but it disregarded entirely the near
unanimous view when it was contrary to its conclusion.
The Court, if it wants to limit the scope of Miles to its facts, as some lower
courts have done, may yet defer to the current dominant rule in the United
States. This could be done by emphasizing the importance of the Jones Act in
its analysis in Miles. Restricting Miles to suits by seamen against their
employers would give deference to the Jones Act and still permit damages in
other maritime cases to conform to the general rule in the United States today.
The Supreme Court could even restrict its ruling in Miles to death cases.
L. The Congressional Mandate?
Why did the Miles Court not adopt the modem American approach, which
allows recovery for loss of consortium? The Court never even mentioned that
possibility because it believed that option was foreclosed by legislation. It stated:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must
look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection
from injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated
extensively in these areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look
primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may
v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Louisiana: Higley v. Kramer, 581 So. 2d 273
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 583 So. 2d 483 (1991); Massachusetts: Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Michigan: Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. 1981); Montana: Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429 (Mont. 1991); Oklahoma: Williams v. Hook,
804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Texas: Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990); Vermont:
Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Washington: Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); West Virginia: Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990);
Wisconsin: Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Wyoming: Nulle v. Gillette-
Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
114. Although not many states have recently re-examined the right of parents to recover loss of
consortium damages for the death of infant children, the following states do allow such recovery:
Arizona: Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Colorado: Miller v. Subia, 514 P.2d
79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Florida: Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973); Hawaii: Masaki
v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989); Idaho: Hayward v. Yost, 242 P.2d 971 (Idaho
1952); Illinois: Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (III. 1984); Ohio: Norvell v. Cuyahoga County
Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Washington: Lockhart v. Besel, 426 P.2d 605 (Wash.
1967); Wisconsin: Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
115. "We will not create, under our admiralty powers, a remedy that is disfavored by a clear




supplement these statutory remedies ... but we must also keep strictly
within the limits imposed by Congress."
1 6
Later, in a similar vein, the Court said with respect to lost wages:
We sail in occupied waters. Maritime tort law is now dominated by
federal statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will simply
because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent
upon them. Congress has placed limits on recovery in survival actions
that we cannot exceed."
7
Admiralty lawyers and others familiar with maritime personal injury law
may find the statements quoted above to be quite extraordinary. Maritime tort
law is not dominated by statutes. True, Congress has enacted some very
important statutes. The DOHSA provides a wrongful death remedy for specified
beneficiaries of persons killed on the high seas by the wrongful conduct of
another. It provides for the recovery of "pecuniary" loss, and it adopts the
general maritime law rule in which contributory negligence mitigates the amount
of damages that can be recovered. The DOHSA, however, does not specify the
wrongful conduct-the elements of torts, such as negligence or products
liability-which support such an action. The DOHSA does not specify the rules
of causation or the effect of assumption of risk in such cases. All of those rules
are part of the general maritime law developed by the courts. Furthermore,
several lower federal courts have created a survival action to complement the
DOHSA. The DOHSA does not deal with persons who have been injured but
not killed on the high seas. In regard to maritime workers such as longshore-
men, Congress has provided a worker's compensation remedy and denied these
employees the right to sue under the Jones Act or for unseaworthiness. But
Congress has also preserved the judicially created rights of these employees to
sue for vessel negligence and to bring tort actions against third parties. In the
context of tort litigation, the rights of maritime workers are primarily dependent
on the rules of the general maritime law.
As to seamen, Congress did not create the right to maintenance and cure; it
did not create the right to sue a vessel owner for unseaworthiness. These rights
were created by the courts. It did enact the Jones Act which, either by creating
a new right or by removing the obstacles to the traditional negligence action or
by both, enables seamen to sue their employers for negligence. Congress,
however, left the courts with the duty of making the rules. The rights of injured
passengers are determined under the general maritime law. The rights applicable
to deaths within territorial waters regardless of status (except for a negligence
action in the case of a deceased seaman) are all controlled by the general
maritime law, as are cases involving injuries on the high seas not resulting in
116. Id. at 27, 111 S. Ct. at 323 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 36, 111 S. Ct. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
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death. To state that "[m]aritime tort law is dominated by federal statute" is not
merely an exaggeration, it is simply inaccurate. Although Congress has enacted
important legislation affecting maritime torts, most of those statutes are bare-
bones statutes. The development of the body of personal injury law has largely
been left to the courts. It has been their duty to put meat on these statutory
bones and to adopt rules under the general maritime law.
Besides reviewing what Congress has done in the maritime tort area, one
must also examine what Congress has not done. In contrast with the legislative
overruling of decisions that had given longshoremen the benefits of the Jones Act
and the warranty of seaworthiness, Congress likewise chose not to overrule either
Moragne, in its 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, or Gaudet, in its 1984
amendments to the LHWCA. In Section 905(b) of the LHWCA, Congress has
confirmed the general maritime law right of a longshoreman to sue for injuries
caused by vessel negligence and, presumably, to pursue the remedies created by
the courts, including loss of consortium. One must assume that Congress, when
it amended the LHWCA, was aware of the Moragne, Gaudet, and Alvez
decisions and that recovery for loss of society has been available in the general
maritime law negligence and unseaworthiness actions.
M. The FELA and the Jones Act
It is submitted that the Miles Court was not compelled by either the FELA
or the Jones Act to preclude the recovery of damages for loss of consortium.
Neither statute expressly excludes loss of consortium as a recoverable item of
damage. Neither statute specifically enumerates the various items of damage
which may be recovered. Thus, neither statute, even by implication, excludes
recovery for loss of consortium. Loss of consortium has been excluded from
recovery of damages under both statutes not because of what Congress has said
in the statutes, but, as will be shown, because of what the courts have said about
the statutes.
At the time of the enactment of the FELA and the Jones Act, what were the
concerns of those who promoted the legislation and the concerns of the Congress
which enacted it? The overriding goals were to promote the safety of employees
and to provide a viable remedy to vulnerable employees engaged in high-risk
occupations in interstate and foreign commerce who were injured or killed in
work-related accidents and who were not adequately protected under state
law.'," Congress had two options: it could have created an exclusive remedy
in the form of a workers' compensation scheme, or it could have removed the
barriers erected by the courts which made it all but impossible for a worker to
recover damages from his employer in a civil action based on negligence. In
enacting the FELA and the Jones Act, Congress implemented the latter (for
118. See, e.g., Melvin L. Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 160, 160-66 (1953).
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reasons not relevant to this article). The important objectives were to provide a
remedy for injured workers who suffered work-related injuries and to provide a
remedy for their families in the event that they were killed. This legislation
concerned lost wages and medical expenses. For reasons which will be
expliined, no one was concerned with or considered a remedy for loss of
consortium.
It is important to recall that, at the time these statutes were enacted, wives
had no claim for loss of consortium for injury or death of their husbands under
either the common law or the general rules of tort law applicable in all of the
states. Statutes extending such a right simply did not exist. Husbands did have
a common-law right to recover damages for loss of consortium for injury to their
wives, but wives had no comparable right."9 It should also be remembered
that, at the time the FELA and the Jones Act were enacted, almost all railroad
workers and seamen were men. No concern was given in these statutes to a
husband's common-law claim for loss of his wife's consortium because the
demographics of the workplace made it unthinkable that a man would ever have
an opportunity to assert such a claim for consortium. No concern was given to
a wife's consortium claim for injury to or death of her husband because wives
had no such claim at common law, and it was not that shortcoming of the
common law on which Congress had focused. It is likely that Congress never
gave a moment's thought to the matter of consortium. In the context of creating
a cause of action for personal injuries sustained by male employees under the
FELA and the Jones Act, it is inconceivable that Congress contemplated
changing the common-law rule on consortium. Furthermore, with regard to
personal injury, both statutes provide a cause of action for "employees" against
their "employers" for injuries sustained in the course of employment. Obviously,
a wife seeking loss of consortium damages for injury to her husband is not an
employee, and she did not sustain "her injury" during the course of "her
119. It has been stated that at common law a husband had a claim "for damages to his marital
interest, that is, for loss of the services and earnings of the wife, interference with his enjoyment of
her society, and for the expense, past and prospective, of treatment of the injury, and any added
burden of support." 1 Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 92, at 330
(1935). Furthermore:
When the wife by reason of her injury, has become totally or partially incapacitated
from furnishing her husband the customary wifely society and companionship, this loss,
past and prospective, is likewise an element of damage in the husband's cause of action
against the wrongdoer at common law. This interest in the wife's society is frequently
called "consortium," though the term, traditionally included also the services and
assistance of the wife already mentioned. The husbands interest in his wife's companion-
ship is not a pecuniary one, nor can any direct evidence as to its value be furnished, and
the jury must be left a large discretion in determining the sum to be allowed.
Id. at 332.
Also, "[iun case of injury to the husband, no corresponding action lies for the wife's loss of her
husband's society." Id. at 333.
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employment." Therefore her loss of consortium is not literally included within
the statute.1
20
Another historical fact must also be considered. The FELA and the Jones
Act not only changed the law on employers' liability for negligence, but they
also changed tort law by creating wrongful death and survival actions. It is
beyond dispute that the wrongful death action creates a right in beneficiaries of
an employee killed in a work-related accident.'2' It is also beyond dispute that
the right is measured by the beneficiary's lOss.122 Thus, the language of the
wrongful death provision does not foreclose recovery for loss of consortium.
The Supreme Court, however, in its 1912 decision in Michigan Central Railroad
v. Vreeland, 23 held that recovery for wrongful death under the FELA was
restricted to "pecuniary loss," and that damages for loss of consortium, inter alia,
could not be recovered under the Act. The Court relied heavily on both the
interpretation given by the English courts of similar language in Lord Campbell's
Act (the first wrongful death statute enacted to modify the common law) and the
interpretation by various state courts of their wrongful death statutes (which were
based on the English statute).
The earlier cases quite properly concluded that, in enacting the FELA and
the Jones Act, Congress did not contemplate departure from the then prevailing
rules on damages, both as to personal injuries and death. But that is not the end
of the matter. As will be shown, although the FELA and the Jones Act are not
comprehensive, they have been interpreted by the courts to embrace a certain
dynamic. These statutes do not spell out all of the details of workers' claims.
It is clear that the claims are based on negligence, except in certain circumstanc-
es in which fault is presumed. It is also clear that specified common-law
defenses do not defeat these claims but give rise to comparative fault, except
under certain circumstances in which diminution of damages is not available to
defendants. But that is, more or less, all that the statutes contain. The courts
have viewed the statutes as having created common-law-like rights in certain
workers for which courts must develop both the parameters and details of those
rights. Neither the FELA nor the Jones Act have been regarded as frozen in the
early twentieth century. With few exceptions, under these statutes, plaintiff
120. When Congress, by the Jones Act... gave a seaman the right to recover for personal
injury caused by the employer's negligence, it did not authorize recovery by the seaman's
wife for loss of consortium. As to non-fatal injuries this is plain from the language of the
statute, which authorizes only the seaman himself (not his wife) to "maintain an action
for damages at law." And it is established also that the damages recoverable by a
'seaman's widow suing for wrongful death under the Jones act do not include recovery for
loss of consortium.
Igneri v. CIE. de Transps. Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266 (2d Cir. 1963) (citations omitted).
121. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 33 S. Ct. 192, 195 (1913) ("The obvious
purpose of Congress was to save a right of action to certain relatives dependent upon an employee
wrongfully injured, for the loss and damage resulting to them financially by reason of the wrongful
death.").
122. Id.
123. 227 U.S. 59, 33 S. Ct. 192 (1913).
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workers' rights have grown as the rights of plaintiffs have grown under the tort
law in this country. 24  Therefore, it is no more correct to say that, because
Congress never considered the issue of loss of consortium, recovery must be
precluded than it would be to say that, because Congress never considered post-
traumatic stress syndrome or inflation, recovery must likewise be precluded.
Likewise, in its interpretation of the term "seamen" in the Jones Act, the Court
has not deemed itself foreclosed from including persons whose duties are quite
remote from the duties performed by seamen in 1920.25
In addition to Vreeland, another FELA case bearing on damages involved
a claim by the father of a deceased minor railroad worker for "expenses incurred
for medical expenses and the loss of the latter's services.' 26  The action had
been brought in state court which allowed recovery on the ground "that the right
of action asserted by the father existed at common law and was not later taken
away by the Federal Employers' Liability Act.', 127  The Supreme Court
reversed on the authority of two cases, neither of which involved loss of services
of a minor child. Rather both held state remedies could not be used to
supplement the FELA. The FELA was the exclusive remedy. The Tonsellito
Court concluded: "Congress having declared when, how far, and to whom
124. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2412 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe Court's duty ... in interpreting FELA ... is to develop a federal common law
of negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the evolving common law."); Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 1417 (1987) ("[We assume] that FELA
jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law developments .... (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 174, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1949))); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523,
547-48, 103 S. Ct. 2541, 2555-56 (1983) (allowing adjustment of award, under the LHWCA, for
inflation, in accordance with the general federal common law); Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,
355 U.S. 426, 432, 78 S. Ct. 394, 398 (1958) ("Congress intended the creation of no static remedy,
but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet the changing conditions and changing
concepts of industry's duty toward its workers."); Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1202-
06 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that common-law cases delineate the bounds of FELA recovery), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1994)
("FELA does not define negligence and therefore leaves the question to be determined by common
law principles as established and applied by the federal courts."); Ries v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1167 (3d Cir. 1992) (Nygaard, J., concurring) ("The development of FELA,
like common law principles, should proceed on a case by case, statute by statute basis to reflect
changing conditions and values."); Wilson v. Zapata Offshore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 265-66 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding, without reaching the issue "whether a purely emotional injury would be cognizable
under the Jones Act," that sexual harassment (in the form of unwanted physical contact), together
with the physical effects of emotional distress, created a claim under the Jones Act); Johnson v. A/S
Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 340 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Kernan); Wilson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
810 F. Supp. 411, 415 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Buell; Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1073, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("[I]t is far more fruitful to view FELA as a living, growing
document than a fossilized one."). See also infra notes 143-145, 153-155 and accompanying text.
125. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991). The Court in
Wilander cited with approval Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), in which the
Fifth Circuit held a member of a drilling crew on a mobile drilling platform could be a seaman.
126. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360, 37 S. Ct. 620 (1917).
127. Id. at 361, 37 S. Ct. at 621.
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carriers are liable on account of accidents in the specified class, such liability can
neither be extended nor abridged by common or statutory laws of the state."12
The Court's opinion was less than two pages long. This case dealt with whether
the common law or statutory law of a state could supplement the FELA, and
there was absolutely no analysis, in the court's opinion, as to whether the father
could recover for loss of his deceased minor son's "services" under the FELA,
as was permitted at common law.
Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the FELA, from its enactment
until approximately 1939, must be read in a particular context. The reaction of
the courts to the FELA must be considered in evaluating the degree of deference
which should be paid to early decisions under the act. Congress, in enacting the
FELA and companion railroad safety regulation, manifested two overriding
purposes: (1) providing greater safety for employees in the operation of
railroads, and (2) shifting the financial "burden of loss resulting from these
casualties from 'those least able to bear it' to those [railroads] who are better
able to bear those losses."' 29 One commentator, after noting that the original
FELA had been declared unconstitutional, 3 characterized the implementation
of the congressional purposes by the courts as follows:
These expressed purposes of Congress and the policy thus
announced did not meet with a friendly reception by the courts. After
adoption of the 1910 amendment, the Employers' Liability Act ran the
rapids of streams of restrictive interpretations and of constructions
placed upon its provisions by the courts which reimposed many of the
old common-law defenses, that, in the original Act, it was the intention
of Congress to abolish. The Act was so battered and damaged at the
hands of the courts by 1939 that further rehabilitation and repair by
Congress became essential. The 1939 amendments repaired the damage
to the Act's provisions that had resulted from its turbulent passage
through the courts. The amendments made the purpose of Congress in
passing the law in the first place so clear and positive as to leave no
reasonable loophole for further innovation by the courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an impressive series of
decisions rendered subsequent to the 1939 amendment and under the
unmistakable authority of its provisions, has written what may be
accepted as the brightest page in the long struggle of operative railroad
men to achieve justice and an equal position of bargaining power with
the then powerful employers in securing adequate safeguards to life and
limb and adequate compensation for wrongful injury and death in the
course of their highly hazardous employment. 31
128. Id. at 362, 37 S. Ct. at 621 (emphasis added).
129. Griffith, supra note 118, at 167-68.
130. The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141 (1908).
131. Griffith, supra note 118, at 168 (emphasis added). Support for this commentator's
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This author agrees that there has been a substantially different emphasis and
tone in the pre- and post-1939 Supreme Court decisions involving the FELA.
Prior to Miles, the emphasis in the post-1939 decisions had been on the remedial
nature of the legislation which was to be liberally construed in favor of injured
workers and their beneficiaries.
N. Pecuniary Loss
One basis for denying recovery for loss of consortium in FELA and Jones
Act actions is that these statutes permit recovery only for pecuniary loss or,
stated in the negative, that these statutes do not permit recovery for non-
pecuniary loss. 32  The use of the terms "pecuniary loss" and "non-pecuniary
loss" has unfortunately induced some courts to dismiss some types of claims for
damages without much analysis. The truth of the matter is that neither the FELA
nor the Jones Act has been applied to exclude all types of non-pecuniary
damages. In actions for personal injury, the injured employee may recover for
his pain and suffering13 3 under both the FELA and the Jones Act. Even the
Miles Court acknowledged that damages for pain and suffering experienced by
evaluation of the pre- and post-1939 decisions involving the FELA is supported by the views of the
general counsel for one of the railroads. He found the early decisions of the Supreme Court to have
been sound and true to the legislation, but that decisions handed down by the "'Roosevelt packed
court' abrogated the established FELA rules which essentially were based on the common law rules
of negligence." Force, supra note 11, at 4 (characterizing the views expressed in Sidney S.
Alderman, What the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of Negligence, 18 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 110 (1953)). Mr. Alderman wasvice-president and general counsel for the Southern
Railway Co.
132. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 33 S. Ct. 192, 195 (1913).
133. If "pecuniary damages" are defined as "those which can be measured with reasonable
accuracy in terms of money," Howard L. Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property § 48, at 32 (1961),
then it must be conceded that pain and suffering do not meet that definition. Pain and suffering are
too subjective. As one commentator has noted:
Pain and suffering are perhaps the only elements of the damage award which are not
related directly or indirectly to an arithmetical base. Other elements, such as impairment
of earning capacity or medical expenses, are to a greater or lesser degree, fastened to
specific figures which may be used as a guide in determining fair and reasonable
compensation. There is no such equivalence between pain and suffering and dollars and
cents. The difficulty is increased by the fact that there is no common experience for use
by the jury in evaluating how much pain the plaintiff has suffered or is presently
suffering.
1 Jacob A. Stein, Personal Injury Damages 16 (2d ed. 1991).
As stated by another commentator:
Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance, and
not a process of measurement, and consequently the judge can, in his instructions give the
jury no standard to go by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their
discretion they may consider reasonable. Rules devised for measuring pecuniary losses
do not fit here.
McCormick, supra note 119, at 318.
The latter commentator also states: "The law furnishes no fixed measure or rule." Id. at 318 n.21.
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a decedent prior to his death are recoverable in a Jones Act survival action
brought by his estate. Also, the Court in Vreeland opined that, upon proper
proof, a child whose parent has been killed may recover damages for loss of
guidance, care, and advice. 3' As applied by later courts, this standard for
recovery of these damages does not require proof of the value of these
"services."' 135
Thus, it is incorrect to say that all non-pecuniary damages are not recover-
able under the FELA and the Jones Act. It is more accurate to say that certain
non-pecuniary injuries are compensable under the FELA and the Jones Act and
that other non-pecuniary injuries are not. Why was such a distinction made?
The distinction was made as early as 1852 in Blake v. The Midland Railway
Co.,136 the seminal case denying recovery for loss of consortium under Lord
Campbell's Act. In Blake, Justice Coleridge stated:
When an action is brought by an individual for personal wrong, the jury
in assessing the damages, can with little difficulty award him a solatium
for his mental sufferings alone, with an indemnity for his pecuniary
loss. There may be a calculation of the pecuniary loss by the different
members of the family from the death of one of them: but, if the jury
were to proceed to estimate the respective degrees of mental anguish of
a widow and twelve children from the death of the father of the family,
a serious danger might arise being given to the ruin of defendants. We
must recollect that the Act we are construing applies not only to great
railway companies but to little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse
with an apprentice.'
37
In this case, in which Lord Campbell himself was a member of the court,
the court made it clear that damages for certain non-pecuniary losses, such as
loss of consortium, were too speculative because of the difficulties in instructing
134. The court stated the husband's "care and advice" may have financial value and be included
within the pecuniary loss which may be recovered if properly pleaded and supported by proper proof.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 73, 33 S. Ct. at 197.
135. See Sea-Land Ser's., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584, 94 S. Ct. 806, 815 (1974). See
also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 497, 100 S. Ct. 755, 759 (1980). Another example
of the permissible recovery of non-pecuniary loss is found in death actions where McCormick, in his
1935 treatise on damages, states that:
While damages for loss of society of the husband and father and for the sorrow of the
wife and children are thus excluded by most courts, the courts are not so materialistic as
to limit compensation entirely to the loss of purely tangible contributions of money,
property, shelter, and food. The evidence may show that the father would have bestowed
upon his children care and attention directed towards training them in mind, morals, and
body for life's tasks. This training has practical and financial value, however, difficult
to estimate in money, and, if proven, is allowed.
McCormick, supra note 119, at 350-51.
136. 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
137. Id. at 41-42.
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the jury on the measure-of damages. The court was also concerned that this
element of damages might be too diverting, because it could open the door to all
kinds of evidence about the relationship between husband and wife and between
parent and children. Finally, there was an apprehension that the damages for loss
of consortium could be both unfair, because defendants would be treated
differently depending on the number of children, and too burdensome on
defendants, so that where a father left behind a large number of children the
amount of damages could be ruinous. The court made much of the fact that this
wrongful death statute was not restricted to wealthy defendants, such as large
railways, but to the ordinary tradesman as well. It was, after all, a general
wrongful death statute.
Lord Campbell's Act was the model for the original wrongful death statutes
in the United States, and it was only natural for American courts to accept the
judicial gloss put on that statute by the English courts in cases such as Blake.
Almost all American courts follow this interpretation of the newly enacted
wrongful death statutes and continue to apply it in FELA and Jones Act cases
despite the fact that some courts have recognized neither statute bars recovery
of all "non-pecuniary" damages. In Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., '
the court of appeals stated:
Yet, while the Jones Act arguably may apply a pecuniary loss
restriction to the personal losses of a decedent's beneficiaries, the Act
does not apply a pecuniary loss restriction to the injuries of a decedent
himself. On the contrary, a decedent's beneficiaries are able to recover
damages for any type of injury or loss which the decedent sustained
during the time he was conscious prior to his death. Section 59 of the
FELA, which is incorporated into the Jones Act provides that "[a]ny
right of action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall
survive to his or her personal representative. .. ." Courts have never
interpreted this provision to require the bifurcation of the conscious pain
and suffering of a decedent or a claimant into categories of "pecuniary
loss" versus "nonpecuniary loss," or into categories of "physical injury"
versus "mental and emotional injury." ...
This policy of allowing damages for a decedent's pain and anguish,
but of excluding damages for the mental pain and anguish of a
decedent's beneficiaries is a policy that is based on sound reasoning.
In essence, the mental pain and suffering of a decedent's beneficiaries
is the emotional response of the beneficiaries to ". . . the harrowing
experience resulting from the death of a loved one." Such suffering,
although often real and intense, is generally obscure and speculative
from an evidentiary point of view. In contrast, the mental pain and
anguish that is experienced by a decedent generally involves discernible
factual elements (e.g., loss of hearing, asphyxiation, impotency), and
138. 626 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1980).
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thus a factfinder is able to make a reasonably accurate assessment of the
injury which the decedent sustained. 3 9
Thus, for a court simply to state that, under the FELA and the Jones Act,
only pecuniary damages may be recovered is simply not accurate. It is submitted
that if damages for loss of consortium are to be denied, it must be because of
some policy relating to their speculative nature, or because of an unwillingness
to delve too deeply into family relationships, or because of a desire to avoid
unfairness or undue burden to defendants. The court in Blake relied on all of
these reasons. 4 Yet, in contrast to the English view, which is still generally
hostile to recovery for loss of consortium in both death and personal injury
cases, " in virtually every state in the United States, a wife may recover
damages for loss of consortium. In contrast to the court's statement in Cook v.
Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., it would be. more accurate to characterize the
prevailing rule in this country as standing for the proposition that such damages
are not too "obscure and speculative from an evidentiary point of view," but are
such as would enable a fact-finder "to make a reasonably accurate assessment of
the injury which the [beneficiary] sustained." In other words, all of the
reservations expressed originally by the court in Blake in construing Lord
Campbell's Act, 4 2 and later accepted by the Supreme Court in its FELA and
Jones Act cases, have been repudiated by the general acceptance of allowing
recovery for loss of consortium in the states. Not only may wives and children
recover for loss of consortium in almost all of the states, but the trend in this
country has been to expand recovery for non-pecuniary damages.'43 These are
the factors that influenced the Court in Gaudet to allow recovery for loss of
consortium in actions under the general maritime law. That Court simply
incorporated the prevailing rule on loss of consortium into the general maritime
law. Recovery for loss of consortium has been the law under the general
maritime law since Gaudet with apparently no ill effects. It is also significant
139. Id. at 749 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted). Note how the court links pain and
suffering to physical injury. But see the discussion of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, infra
notes 153-158 and accompanying text, in which the Supreme Court sustained an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress even in the absence of an accompanying physical injury.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
141. The Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 has been interpreted in the following manner: "Damages
cannot be recovered as a compassionate allowance or solatium to the dependents for their mental
anguish or loss of society caused by the death." 34 Halsbury's Laws of England para. 94 (4th Ed.
1980) (footnotes omitted) (citing Percy v. Brown, 108 Sol. J. 219 (1964) and Regan v. Williamson,
2 All E.R. 241 (1976)).
'The right of a husband to damages for loss of consortium against a person who negligently injures
his wife is an anomaly ... and should not be extended to a wife in the case of a tort depriving her
of the consortium of her husband." 27 (1) The Digest: Annotated British, Commonwealth and
European Cases 11253 (1988).
142. Blake v. The Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41-42 (1852). These reservations include
the difficulty in assessing damages, introduction of evidence of family relations, and unfairness.
143. See supra notes 105, 111-112 and accompanying text.
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that, unlike Lord Campbell's Act, which applies to the tradesman as well as the
railway, the FELA and the Jones Act apply only to railroads and shipping
companies. 44 One also should observe that, by making loss of consortium
available as a recoverable item of damages in wrongful death and personal injury
cases, the states have also made it applicable to the tradesman and everyone else.
Thus, the Court could have reached a different result in Miles without doing
violence to any legislatively established rule. As stated earlier, neither the Jones
Act nor the FELA, expressly or by implication, precludes recovery for loss of
consortium. The Court in Miles could have done one of two things: it could
have reiterated its conclusion in Gaudet and continued to allow recovery for loss
of consortium under the general maritime law as a supplement to the Jones Act;
or, preferably, it could have re-examined its earlier decisions on loss of
consortium under the FELA and the Jones Act and concluded they were no
longer viable in the context of the contemporary law of consortium in the United
States. These two statutes historically have been given a liberal interpretation in
favor of railroad and maritime workers.1 45  Congress, when it enacted these
statutes without enumerating the damages recoverable, must have intended to
authorize the award of damages under the then prevailing rules relating to
damages in personal injury and death cases. If the rules on damages currently
prevailing have been changed to allow greater recovery to an injured person and
his family, is there any reason to believe that Congress would not have expected
the courts to apply those rules in FELA and Jones Act cases?
Congress, in enacting the FELA and the Jones Act, provided railroad workers
and seamen with a common-law negligence action 46 on very favorable terms by
eliminating the "killer" defenses of contributory negligence,'47 assumption of
risk, 4 and the fellow servant doctrine. 49 Congress must have been aware that
the law of negligence was not fixed or static. There is no reason to believe
Congress would expect the courts to deny to railroad workers and seamen remedies
available to virtually all other plaintiffs in personal injury and death cases. 50 The
144. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2412 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
145. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1030 (1949) (referring to the
"breadth of statutory language, the Act's humanitarian purposes, [and] its accepted standard of liberal
construction to accomplish those goals" of the FELA); Brister v; A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 354 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe Jones Act generally provides for a broad basis for liability. In addition, the Jones
Act contains a liberal causation requirement. If the defendant's negligence played any part, however
small, in producing the seaman's injury, it results in liability.").
146. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 1417 (1987)
(holding that FELA jurisprudence gleans its guidance from common-law developments).
147. See supra note 1.
148. See supra note 1.
149. See supra note 1. See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2404
(1994) ("In order to further FELA's humanitarian purposes, Congress did away with several common
law tort defenses that had effectively barred recovery by injured workers. Specifically, the statute
abolished the fellow servant rule .... ").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 129, 145, 147, and infra text accompanying notes
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Miles Court would only have had to conclude that it should no longer follow the
English lead because the law generally applicable in personal injury and death cases
in the United States had become so different from English law, which still refuses
to recognize the right of a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium,15 ' and
under which even the common-law right of a husband to recover has been
criticized.'5 2 In other words, the Court could have allowed the current situation
and trends in the United States to inform its view, thereby enabling it to conclude
that allowing recovery for loss of consortium in the 1990's is not inconsistent with
Congress' goals in the first thirty years of the twentieth century.
0. Statutory Construction of the FELA and the Jones Act
The mechanical approach to statutory construction and the diminished role of
the judiciary in FELA and Jones Act cases, as articulated in the opinion for the
unanimous Miles Court, appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court's most
recent attempt to reconcile these statutes with contemporary developments in tort
law in this country. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the
subject of statutory interpretation of the FELA.153 At issue was whether the
FELA permitted recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress, and, if so,
what limitations should be placed on the right to recover-that is, under what
circumstances should a plaintiff be permitted to recover? The Court was divided
in constructing a framework for interpretation. The context for this difference of
view was the formulation of the specific test for delimiting recovery for emotional
distress. The majority opinion, in criticizing the court below, stated:
By treating the common-law tests as mere arbitrary restrictions to be
disregarded if they stand in the way of recovery on "meritorious" FELA
claims, the Third Circuit put the cart before the horse: the common law
must inform the availability of a right to recover under FELA for
negligently inflicted emotional distress, so the "merit" of a FELA claim
of this type cannot be ascertained without reference to the common
law.1
54
The Court noted that, at the time the FELA was enacted, the common law
recognized recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The Court then
considered the tests for recovery at that time and those that have since been
developed under state tort law. It did not adopt the most liberal and most recently
formulated test used by the court below, but instead adopted a test that was still, at
best, very much a minority view at the time the FELA was enacted. There is no
154 and 156.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
152. Id.
153. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
154. Id. at 2408.
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doubt that the methodology of the majority opinion places considerable weight on
the state of the common law at the time of the enactment of the statute. Yet, there
is also no doubt that the Court did not believe that it was "mandated" to adopt the
prevailing test at the time of the enactment of the statute.
The dissenting opinion critized the majority's lack of precision as to the exact
weight to be given to the common law in existence at the time of the enactment of
the FELA because the majority did not clarify whether the common law at the time
of enactment or the current state of the common law was the decisive factor. 155
It is indisputable, though, that the majority did not believe it was bound to follow
the common-law view which was the majority view when the FELA was enacted;
and it did not, ultimately, adopt that view. That the common-law majority view had
generally been repudiated and had virtually no support in the states led the Court
to reject it. The Court did not regard the common law in existence at the time the
FELA was enacted as frozen into that statute. Further, it did not regard its hands
as being tied by those common-law rules in effect in the early 1900's. The Court's
approach reveals that it has an active role in interpreting the FELA and should not
follow a mechanical approach to that Act.
If the Miles Court had used the approach articulated in the majority opinion
described above, it should have reached a different conclusion on the loss of
consortium issue. The current state of the law clearly and overwhelmingly favors
recovery for loss of consortium. Under the common law in existence at the time
the FELA was enacted, loss of consortium was compensable in a common-law tort
action brought by a husband for injuries to his wife. Although it is true that
recovery was not allowed in a suit brought by a wife for injuries to her husband, it
is inconceivable that the common-law discrimination against women would be
acceptable to the Court today. The FELA is a remedial statute; and, because
women can now recover for loss of their husband's consortium in every state where
consortium damages are allowed, it would be appropriate to extend to the wife the
right to recover such damages for injury to her husband. In the interest of
uniformity, the right to recover for loss of consortium could also be extended to
wrongful death actions as it has in the vast majority of states.
155. The Court offers three justifications for its adoption of the "zone of danger" test.
First the Court suggests that the "zone" test is most firmly rooted in "the common law."
The court mentions that several jurisdictions had adopted the zone of danger test by 1908
and that the test is "currently followed in 14 American jurisdictions." But that very
exposition tells us that the "zone" test never held sway in a majority of States.
Morevover, the Court never decides firmly on the point of reference, present, or
historical, from which to evaluate the relative support the different common-law rules
have enjoyed. If the Court regarded as decisive the degree of support a rule currently
enjoys among state courts, the Court would allow bystander recovery, permitted in some
form in "nearly half the States." If, on the other hand, the Court decided that historical
support carried the day, then the impact rule preferred by most jurisdictions in 1908 would
be the Court's choice.
Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The same result is much easier to reach under the approach articulated in
Justice Souter's concurring opinion. Although he joined in the Court's holding, he
wrote:
separately to make explicit what I believe the Court's duty to be in
interpreting FELA. That duty is to develop a federal common law of
negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the evolving common
law. As we have explained:
[I]nstead of a detailed statute codifying common-law principles,
Congress saw fit to enact a statute of the most general terms,
thus leaving in large measure to the courts the duty of fashioning
remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to the
development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear that
the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery
for injured workers.., and it is also clear that Congress intended
the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be
developed and enlarged to meet the changing conditions and
changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers.156
The dissenting opinion also quoted some of the same language from Kernan
and stressed the remedial purposes of the Act and the liberal construction applied
to it by the courts.157 Thus, under the approaches to statutory construction in
FELA cases used in the concurring and dissenting opinions, the liberal objectives
of the FELA-Jones Act legislation would best be served by giving railroad workers
and seamen recovery in no smaller amount than is generally recovered in land-
based tort actions in most states. The only way that recovery of loss of consortium
would be denied to anyone, except a husband, would be if the Court adopted an
approach to interpreting the FELA and the Jones Act which froze the elements of
damages to those that were available under the common law at the time of their
enactment. This approach is not only inconsistent with the liberal purposes
underlying the legislation, but it is inconsistent with the methodology used by the
Court in interpreting both statutes.' 8
P. Two Further Observations
1. Inconsistency in the Court's Approach to Maritime Personal Injuries
It is difficult to reconcile the Court's decision in Miles precluding recovery
for loss of consortium with its statement in Miles acknowledging the existence
156. Id. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S.
426, 432, 78 S. Ct. 394, 398 (1958)).
157. Id. at 2413 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2413-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 568-70, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 1417-18 (1987)).
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of a remedy for seamen under the general maritime law for injury or death
caused by unseaworthy conditions.'59 It is difficult to understand how the
former (a remedy) is restricted by the Jones Act and the latter (a right of action)
is not. In the Jones Act, Congress gave to seamen a right of action against their
employers based on fault, that is, "negligence." Under the general maritime law,
the Supreme Court has given to seamen a right of action based upon strict
liability. Therein lies a danger in the Court's analysis because, it may be argued,
if a seaman's rights are restricted to those expressed in the Jones Act and those
judicial decisions interpreting the Jones Act, it seems that much of what the
Court has done in the area of creating the unseaworthiness remedy must suffer
the same fate as loss of consortium. Insofar as Congress created a right of action
based on negligence with nary a word about unseaworthiness, could it not be
argued that Congress overruled not only The Osceola's statements that had
negated a seaman's right to recover for negligence, but also the statements
whereby the Court had created a seaman's right to recover for unseaworthi-
ness?W If the Jones Act controls the right of a seaman to recover damages
for personal injuries and the right of his survivors to recover in case of his death,
both rights predicated on a showing of employer negligence,16 1 then how can
159. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29, 111 S. Ct. 317, 324 (1990).
160. If it be answered the Jones Act claim is against the seaman's employer, and the general
maritime law unseaworthiness claim is against the vessel owner, then why should that distinction not
be equally controlling on the issue of damages? The Jones Act does not expressly overrule the
unseaworthiness holding in The Osceola, but it does not purport to preserve it either. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has said the FELA is exclusive and controls the right of a railroad worker or his
beneficiaries to recover from his employer. If the rights of seamen were totally driven by the Jones
Act via the FELA, then serious doubts could be expressed with regard to the viability of the
unseaworthiness action. The Jones Act, however, has never been completely driven by the FELA,
and seaman's remedies have never been completely circumscribed by the Jones Act. The actions for
maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness survived the enactment of the Jones Act and, until Miles,
have had an independent existence. The reason for this lies in the nature of the general maritime law
in the United States. The development of the general maritime law under Article III of the
Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in the sources of law relating to the activities of
railroads. Thus, the lock step reasoning that loss of consortium is not available in FELA actions,
hence not available in Jones Act cases, and the inevitable conclusion that it is not thus available in
actions created under the general maritime law simply ignores the history and role of the courts in
fashioning rights and remedies under the general maritime law. This shortcoming in the Miles'
decision is discussed later.
161. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2404 (1994), the majority of the
Court said:
That FELA is to be liberally construed, however, does not mean that it is a workers'
compensation statute. We have insisted that FELA "does not make the employer the
insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of liability is his
negligence, not the fact that injuries occur." And while "[wihat constitutes negligence for
the statute's purposes is a federal question" we have made clear that this federal question
generally turns on principles of common law: "the Federal Employers' Liability Act is
founded on common-law concepts of negligence and injury, subject to such qualifications
as Congress has imported into those terms." Those qualifications ... are the modification
or abrogation of several common-law defenses to liability, including contributory
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a judicially created right based on strict liability also exist when the employer is
also the vessel owner, as is often the case? The Court is inconsistent in it use
of legislation as a constricting, higher authority. To eliminate or minimize this
inconsistency, the Court must find a way of limiting Miles, unless it wants its
decision on a relatively minor aspect of personal injury and death law to spill
over into more significant issues.
2. Renunciation of the Courts Constitutional Role in Admiralty Cases
A second observation relates to the relationship between the Jones Act and
the FELA. In its early Jones Act cases, the Court simply applied its decisions
in FELA cases to actions brought under the Jones Act. This approach is logical
and is supported by the language of the Jones Act. Yet while resort to decisions
under the FELA may be appropriate in most instances, it should be noted that the
rights of seamen, as developed under the general maritime law, have never been
as narrow as the rights of railroad employees. Under the general maritime law,
seamen have the right to recover maintenance and cure and may bring an action
in strict liability for unseaworthiness. Conversely, railroad employees must prove
negligence to recover damages and may rely on strict liability only upon proof
of a violation of a safety statute or regulation. This difference is not merely one
of degree. It indicates that there is a significant difference in the role of the
federal judiciary in handling railroad cases under the FELA and its role in
handling maritime personal injury cases under Article III of the Constitution, 62
Prior to the enactment of the FELA, a federal court could entertain the claim
of an injured railroad worker only under its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
and the worker's right to recover was based on state law. The federal courts had
not assumed the responsibility for fashioning a federal common-law remedy for
such workers, nor did they have any constitutional authority to do so. Prior to
the enactment of the Jones Act, the federal courts, under Article III of the
Constitution, had created remedies for injured seamen in the form of maintenance
and cure and for injures caused by an unseaworthy vessel. In enacting the Jones
Act, Congress supplemented these judicially created remedies. The Court has
never taken the position that, in enacting the Jones Act, Congress intended to
preempt the judicially created remedies. In fact, the Court has held to the
contrary, and injured seamen may invoke both the Jones Act statutory remedy
and the judicially created remedies in a single action. 163 In the development
negligence and assumption of risk.
(quoting Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649, 653, 67 S. Ct. 598, 600 (1947) and Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 182, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1027, 1030-31 (1949)) (citations omitted).
162. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
163. The Jones Act does not preclude a remedy for unseaworthiness or maintenance and cure.
See Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 361 (5th Cir. 1991) ("A maintenance and cure claim
typically accompanies other claims, such as the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.... [Aln
award for maintenance and cure is independent of these other sources of recovery.").
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of a body of admiralty and maritime law, the courts and Congress have operated
as partners. This is true not only in the area of maritime personal injuries, but
in other areas as well.'" It is not suggested that Congress and courts are equal
partners in this venture, an issue which need not be explored here, but it is
undeniable that, through its power to formulate rules of the general maritime law,
the Court has been more of a law creator than it has been in other areas of law
over which it exercises jurisdiction.' The judicihry has shown its willingness
to develop the admiralty and maritime law so as to fulfill its responsibility under
Article III of the Constitution, barring an outright conflict with a Congressional
statute. 1 Furthermore, Congress appears to have accepted this as an appropri-
164. The Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196 (1988), the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988), and the Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1988), provide a
statutory framework for dealing with problems arising from the carriage of goods. But this
legislation has many significant gaps which have had to be filled by the courts, not the least of which
are problems created by the "container revolution" which had not occurred when this legislation was
enacted. See Mitsui & Co. v. America Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981). More
importantly though, the entire law of charter parties is judge made. 2 Schoenbaum, supra note 100,
ch. 11 passim. The subject of towage is dominated by case law. Id. ch. 12 passim. Congress has
ignored the area of marine insurance and left that important subject to the courts. See generally
Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty ch. 2, at 53-92 (2d ed. 1975). Marine
pollution on the other hand has become increasingly statutory, but it should be noted that important
legislation like the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. V 1993), has preserved
maritime remedies. Id. § 275 1(e). See also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Although there are some
statutes that deal with salvage, that area is primarily controlled by case law. Gilmore & Black, supra,
ch. 8, at 532-85. Pilotage is a blend of statutory and case law, however, case law dominates the
liability issues. 2 Schoenbaum, supra note 100, ch. 13 passim. Collision law is also a blend of
legislation (and administrative regulations) and case law, the latter of which has established the rules
of liability and damages. Id. ch. 12.
165. See Brown, supra note 71, at 249 ("The United States Constitution and Congress have
expressly granted admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts. Exercising this authority,
admiralty judges have enunciated principles of maritime law that provide both certainty to
commercial shipping and protection to those who risk their life or property at sea. Moreover, the
image of the great maritime judges and their opinions have. been a beacon to judges in other areas
of the law."). See also John D. Kimball, Miles: "This Much and No More... ", 25 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 319, 320 (1994) ("While Congress unquestioningly has power to pass legislation which affects
all aspects of the maritime law, under the Constitution the Court has an equal, if not preeminent, role
and is vested with jurisdiction to declare the general maritime law.").
166. See CEH, Inc. v. FV "Seafarer," 153 F.R.D. 491,496 (D.R.I. 1994) (referring to the "judge-
made general maritime law of negligence and unseaworthiness"). An admiralty court can create
maritime remedies within the limits imposed by federal statutory maritime law. Id. See also Oil
Shipping v. Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S., 10 F.3d 1015 (3d Cir. 1993) (referring to the judge-
made principles governing conflict of laws in maritime lien cases); Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545
F.2d 854, 862 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[I]n the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law
as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to the matters within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."). Brown also supports the contention that state statutory
law is invalid to the extent that it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law." Id.
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ate role for the courts, and has legislatively overruled or modified judge-created
law only on rare occasions.
Inasmuch as the Court will have to re-examine Gaudet in light of Miles (and
Higginbotham)167 and only one of these approaches may be able to survive
such analysis, Gaudet should prevail. This result is suggested not only to keep
the law regarding loss of consortium in maritime tort cases consistent with the
law in land-based tort cases, but also to maintain the important and unique role
of the judiciary in developing the general maritime law.
Q. The DOHSA
In pursuing its twin goals of uniformity and deference to legislation, the
Miles Court also used the DOHSA as a point of reference. The DOHSA, as the
Court noted, provides recovery for "pecuniary loss"; and in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham,168 the Court held that damages recoverable under the general
maritime law, such as for loss of consortium, may not be awarded to supplement
the pecuniary loss recoverable under the DOHSA. Miles involved a death in
territorial waters, and thus neither the DOHSA nor Higginbotham's judicial gloss
on the DOHSA was controlling. As has been demonstrated, maritime personal
injury law is far from uniform, and the discrepancy between damages recoverable
for deaths occurring in DOHSA waters and those recoverable in Gaudet waters,
especially on a relatively unimportant damages issue, could have been regarded
simply as just another incongruity. The Miles Court, however, in pursuit of
uniformity, reasoned that, since Congress has expressly limited recovery to
pecuniary damages under the DOHSA, this congressionally established standard
could not be ignored in formulating a uniform rule to govern loss of consortium
claims in seamen's wrongful death actions.
This is a difficult point to contest in light of the Court's earlier decision in
Higginbotham. Had that decision never been made, the Court could have used
the general maritime law to supplement the DOHSA, just as it had used the
general maritime law to supplement the Jones Act. However, Higginbotham
rejected that contention. How could the Court in Miles have avoided its
application? The Court in Miles was faced with the prospect of overruling either
Gaudet (at least in part) or Higginbotham. The Miles Court could have
overruled Higginbotham by saying that, at the time Higginbotham was decided,
it believed the two rules could co-exist, in that there could be recovery only for
pecuniary losses under the DOHSA and recovery for loss of consortium for
deaths in territorial waters. There would have been a rational reason for this
disparity because the Moragne-Gaudet decisions, to some extent, had supplanted
167. It is unlikely the law will develop to the point where no decedent's beneficiary will be able
to recover damages for loss of consortium except the survivor of a longshoreman killed in territorial
waters. That simply would make no sense.
168. 436 U.S. 618, 624-26, 98 S. Ct. 2010, 2014-15 (1978).
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state wrongful death statutes which had been used to provide a remedy for deaths
that occurred in territorial and inland waters.'69 Since the Moragne-Gaudet
decisions were intended to be remedial, it is only logical that they should provide
remedies that were at least as expansive as remedies under state law. The
Gaudet Court adopted a rule allowing recovery for loss of consortium in
wrongful death cases because that was the rule in a majority of states. If the
Court had now concluded that the two rules could not co-exist, the Higginbotham
rule could have been abandoned. The Court, however, chose not to do so.
Furthermore, although the Court has expressly refused to overrule Gaudet, its
analysis certainly has undermined it. In fact, as stated above, some lower courts
now treat Gaudet as, in effect, having been overruled.
It would have been preferable for the Court to have "revised" the Higgin-
botham holding, and not the Gaudet holding, notwithstanding the language of the
DOHSA. In preferring Gaudet, several factors should be considered. First of
all, the use of the word "pecuniary" in the DOHSA must be placed in context.
As an historical fact, and viewed as a practical matter, the use of the word
"pecuniary" adds nothing to the DOHSA statute. The DOHSA is a Lord
Campbell-type of wrongful death statute and was enacted in 1920. At that time
the universal rule both in the United States and in England was that, under this
kind of statute, recovery was permitted only for "pecuniary" loss. That was the
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in the early FELA and Jones Act death
cases, notwithstanding that those statutes did not specifically include the word
"pecuniary" to qualify the "loss" for which a decedent's dependents could
recover. It is reasonable to conclude that, even if the word "pecuniary" had not
been included in the DOHSA, the courts would have interpreted the statute as
being limited to recovery of "pecuniary loss" as they had done in FELA and
Jones Act cases. It is submitted that Congress used the word "pecuniary" not to
restrict the scope of damages but to assure that plaintiffs would recover damages
in no smaller amount than would have been recoverable in wrongful death
actions under generally prevailing state laws. In other words, the DOHSA
adopted rules on damages generally applicable at that time in wrongful death
cases for deaths occurring on land.
The Maritime Law Association of the United States prepared the original
draft of the DOHSA and endorsed it along with the American Bar Association.
With respect to damages, the draft proposed that recovery should provide "fair
and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary damages resulting from
each injury and death to the deceased's husband, wife or next of kin, severally,
not exceeding in all the sum of $5000.''l7o Note that the original version
169. A recent decision by the Third Circuit challenges this conclusion as an absolute rule and
holds that under certain circumstances, such as in the case of the death of a recreational boater in
state territorial waters, state wrongful death and survival remedies should be applied. Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994).
170. George Whitelock, A New Development in the Application of Extra-Territorial Law to
Extra-Territorial Marine Torts, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 403, 416 (1909) (emphasis added).
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proposed to Congress contained a limit of $5,000 as the maximum total amount
recoverable. This limitation was rejected by Congress, and no limit is imposed
save that under the general Limitation of Liability Act.' This confirms the
conclusion that Congress regarded the DOHSA as remedial legislation and
intended it to be subject to the general rules applied in wrongful death actions.
The major reason for preferring Gaudet over Higginbotham is that Gaudet
reflects the modem rule on loss of consortium in the United States. The
rationale in the early decisions interpreting Lord Campbell-type statutes has been
rejected in almost every state. Thus, the approach for interpreting the FELA and
the Jones Act in light of the current view on recovery for loss of consortium
suggested earlier could be applied to actions brought under the DOHSA as well,
and uniformity would be achieved. Would such a construction of the statute in
the pursuit of uniformity exact too high a cost in terms of remaining true to the
language of the statute? Probably not with regard to this statute. The inclusion
of the word "pecuniary" in the DOHSA should not, standing alone, constitute an
obstacle to a broader remedy under the DOHSA. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court, in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,72 interpreted language in the
DOHSA, which purports to confer jurisdiction over DOHSA actions "in the
district courts of the United States, in admiralty," as permitting state courts to
entertain actions brought under the DOHSA. If that kind of statutory interpreta-
tion was not regarded as extravagant, then the interpretation of the word
"pecuniary" suggested herein would likewise be within appropriate limits of
statutory interpretation. But, even if the Court was not prepared to go that far,
it still could have opted to allow the general maritime law to supplement this
remedial statute in light of the fact there is no evidence that Congress intended
persons who are killed on the high seas to recover less damages than are
generally recovered in cases in which people have been killed on land.
R. Forecasting the Future-Part 2 Placing Limits On Miles
The discussion of "uniformity" and "legislation" was not undertaken as a
mere academic exercise and was not intended as criticism for the sake of
criticism. It has been suggested in the foregoing discussion that, although
Gaudet can be factually distinguished from Miles and Higginbotham, some lower
courts have treated Gaudet as having been overruled by Miles while other courts,
continuing to apply Gaudet, have restricted Miles to its facts and its holding.
171. See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988) ("[Tlhe recovery in such suit
shall be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the person for whose benefit
the suit is brought .... "). See also supra note 26.
172. 477 U.S. 207, 221, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1986) ("These references persuade us that the
first sentence of section seven was intended only to serve as a jurisdictional savings clause, ensuring
that state courts enjoyed the right to entertain causes of action and provide wrongful death remedies
both for accidents arising on territorial waters, and, under DOHSA, for accidents occurring more than
one maritime league from shore.").
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These conflicts in the lower courts, together with the fundamentally different
approaches by the Court in Gaudet and Miles, may require the Supreme Court
to revisit the damages issue and to choose between the Miles and Gaudet
approaches. Preferably, the rules on damages under the general maritime law
in tort cases should be no less generous than the rules applicable under current
land-based tort law.
If the Court is unwilling to overrule Miles, must the twin screws of
uniformity and deference to legislation drive the resolution of all non-pecuniary
damages issues, save pain and suffering of the party injured or killed, in all
maritime personal injury and death cases? Not necessarily. There are middle
grounds, but they require making distinctions that trench upon uniformity.'
If a seaman's beneficiaries are denied recovery for loss of consortium, but others
such as beneficiaries of maritime workers and passengers are allowed to recover,
the law will not be uniform, even if there is a valid basis for treating the groups
differently. Likewise, if the beneficiaries of seamen are denied recovery for loss
of consortium in suits against the decedent's employer but are permitted to
recover such damages from non-employer defendants, there will be a lack of
uniformity even though there may be valid grounds for making the distinction.
Finally, if loss of consortium is abolished as a basis for recovery because it is
not a pecuniary loss but recovery is permitted for punitive damages, which are
also non-pecuniary, there will again be a lack of uniformity. Yet, as a matter of
policy, there may be justifications for allowing recovery of punitive damages
which simply are not applicable to loss of consortium. If the Court is willing to
tolerate some lack of uniformity, there are rational legal arguments for confining
Miles to its facts or at least almost to its facts.
A clear distinction should be drawn in regard to the punitive damages issue.
Miles did not involve punitive damages, and the holding of the Court does not
purport to address the issue. Punitive damages, in one form or another, are
recoverable in virtually every state1 and have long been recognized in
173. It is hoped the discussion of legislation and legislative interest demonstrates the Court is
not mandated by legislation to deny recovery of either loss of consortium or punitive damages. The
same may be said with respect to loss of future earnings, although the element of damages is not the
focal point of this paper.
174. Forty-three states recognize punitive damages in one form or another; in 38 states, they are
available in all tort cases, and in five more states they are available in tort actions, with some causes
of action excepted.
Following is a state-by-state examination of punitive damages, distilled from Guide to State Law
on Punitive Damages, 8 Adelphia L.J. 173 (1992). Alabama: allowed in all tort cases without
substantial restriction; Alaska: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Arizona:
allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Arkansas: allowed in all tort cases without
substantial restriction; California: allowed only in death cases which resulted in homicide charges,
but the amount may not be stated in claim; Colorado: allowed in all tort cases with special
restrictions in health malpractice cases; Connecticut: allowed in all tort cases but only as
compensation for actual losses, including cost of litigation; Delaware: allowed in all tort cases
without substantial restriction; Florida: allowed only in civil actions; Georgia: allowed in all tort
cases without substantial restriction; Hawaii: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction;
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maritime law, 175 even in personal injury cases. Punitive damages are not
"pecuniary" as that term is usually defined; but even under the FELA and the
Jones Act, certain types of non-pecuniary damages are recoverable. The
determination as to whether a particular type of non-pecuniary damages is
recoverable should be based on policy considerations and not merely on the
"non-pecuniary" label stamped on it. The classification of damages into
categories of pecuniary and non-pecuniary, a classification which is of dubious
value, should be restricted to compensatory damages, that is, in determining
whether recovery should be permitted for certain losses sustained by the plaintiff.
No one doubts that a wife whose husband has been killed may have suffered an
emotional injury more devastating than any financial loss. The early wrongful
death decisions, although denying recovery for such losses, never denied the fact
of loss. The issue in such cases has been whether, for reasons of public policy,
recovery of damages for such losses should be precluded.
Punitive damages are not compensatory. They are not, awarded to
compensate an injured party for any loss. Punitive damages, as the name
suggests, are awarded to punish tortfeasors. The focal point in awarding
compensatory damages is on the injured party-the plaintiff. The focal point in
Idaho: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Illinois: allowed in some tort cases
but not in "healing art or legal malpractice" cases; Indiana: allowed in all tort cases without
substantial restriction; Kansas: allowed in all tort cases with special restrictions in medical
malpractice and under respondeat superior; Kentucky: allowed in some tort cases, but not allowed
in contract, and severely restricted under respondeat superior; Louisiana: allowed only if expressly
authorized by statute; Maine: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Maryland:
allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Massachusetts: allowed only if expressly
granted by statute; Michigan: allowed in all tort cases but generally used as compensatory, not
punitive; Minnesota: allowed in all tort cases but severely restricted under respondeat superior;
Mississippi: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Missouri: allowed in all tort
cases without substantial restriction; Montana: allowed only if expressly authorized by statute;
Nebraska: none allowed; Nevada: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; New
Hampshire: allowed only if expressly authorized by statute; New Jersey: allowed in all tort cases
without substantial restriction; New Mexico: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction;
New York: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; North Carolina: allowed in all
tort cases without substantial restriction; North Dakota: allowed in all tort cases without substantial
restriction; Ohio: allowed in all tort cases, though there are stricter requirements in products liability
cases; Oklahoma: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Oregon: allowed in most
tort cases, but not against health practitioners; Pennsylvania: allowed in all tort cases without
substantial restriction; Rhode Island: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; South
Carolina: allowed in most tort cases, but not allowed in strict liability cases; South Dakota: allowed
in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Tennessee: allowed in all tort cases without
substantial restriction; Texas: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Utah: allowed
in all tort cases without.substantial restriction; Vermont: allowed in all tort cases without substantial
restriction; Virginia: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Washington: allowed
only if expressly granted by statute; West Virginia: allowed in all tort cases without substantial
restriction; Wisconsin: allowed in all tort cases without substantial restriction; Wyoming: allowed
in all tort cases without substantial restriction.
175. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818); Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line,
Inc., 904 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981).
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awarding punitive damages is on the injuring party-the defendant. Thus, a
decision as to whether punitive damages may be awarded in maritime personal
injury cases should not be made with reference to the criteria for recovery
articulated in cases such as Miles and Higginbotham, which determine only
which kinds of compensatory damages may be awarded in various maritime
personal injury cases. The Jones Act, 7 6 the DOHSA, and the LHWCA deal
with compensatory damages. In the absence of contrary or superseding
legislation, the utility of punitive damages in maritime law is a matter of public
policy for the courts to decide. It would be an abdication of judicial responsibili-
ty to preclude recovery of punitive damages merely because they are "non-
pecuniary," or merely because Congress occasionally has authorized recovery of
penalties in certain circumstances'77 and has not similarly provided for punitive
damages in the Jones Act and other personal injury and death statutes. A crucial
question is whether the possibility of sanctions against defendants in the form of
punitive damages promotes safety in the maritime industry. It would not seem
to be consistent with the goal of maritime safety to deny recovery for punitive
damages in cases in which defendants have manifested a callous disregard for the
safety of others on navigable waters, whereas punitive damages would have been
awarded if similar callousness had resulted in injury or death on the land.
With respect to damages for loss of consortium, Miles should be distin-
guished from cases involving injuries to or death of a non-seaman. In the view
of the Miles Court, the Jones Act and the scope of damages recoverable by
beneficiaries of a seaman from the seaman's employer in Jones Act cases were
compelling factors in reaching its conclusion as to the scope of damages
recoverable in a similar action under the general maritime law. The Court
believed itself to be constrained by the Jones Act from giving a designated class
of plaintiffs, seamen, a more extensive remedy under judge-made law than
"Congress" had, in the Court's view, seen fit 'to authorize by statute. 78 This
deference to statute is simply not required in situations in which the injured party
is not a seaman and neither the Jones Act nor any other statute prescribes the
measure of damages. It is important to remember that the Jones Act creates a
negligence action that is, in some respects, more advantageous to seamen than
an ordinary general maritime law negligence action, for it includes a reduced
quantum of proof of negligence and a "featherweight" burden of proving
causation.'79 The rights and-remedies of non-seamen and their beneficiaries,
176. But see 46 U.S.C.A. § 10313(c) (1988) (entitling a seaman, improperly discharged within
one month of the voyage's beginning, to one month's wages as compensation, in addition to wages
earned); id. § 10504(c) (assessing two days wages against the owner as penalty for every day the
owner delays payment of wages to the seaman).
177. See supra note 176.
178. Again it should be noted neither the FELA nor the Jones Act enumerates the elements of
recoverable damages or specifically excludes recovery for any particular element of damages.
179. (i) The Jones Act was to be liberally interpreted in the seaman's favor, (ii) the seaman had
only to prove "slight negligence" which could be accompanied by very little evidence, and (iii)
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however, have been created under the general maritime law, and such plaintiffs
do not benefit from the reduced quantum of proof of negligence and the
"featherweight" burden of proving causation applicable only in Jones Act cases.
If these plaintiffs do not enjoy the benefits of the Jones Act, then, in fairness, the
detriments derived from the Jones Act should not be imposed upon them.
Some may suggest that, if loss of consortium is denied to a seaman's
beneficiaries, recovery should also be denied to all other beneficiaries. The
response is simply that the Court in Miles did not preclude recovery on the
merits of the loss of consortium issue, that is, on whether public policy favors
the award of damages for loss of consortium in personal injury and death cases.
The Court never decided that loss of consortium is not the kind of loss that
should be compensable in a tort action. Recovery was denied primarily because
the Court believed it was foreclosed by the Jones Act.'80 If the Court believes
that an award for loss of consortium is a proper item of tort damages, then it
should permit such an award where not restricted by statute. The availability of
the Jones Act in cases involving seamen makes it easier to prove a case but,
under Miles, damages may be restricted. The unavailability of the Jones Act, in
the case of non-seamen, makes it more difficult to prove a case, but all proper
tort damages should be recovered. As far as recovery for loss of consortiurfi,
some plaintiffs will have the misfortune of being beneficiaries of a seaman, but
that is no reason to inflict that unfortunate circumstance on non-seamen. In these
situations, only a rigid and narrow adherence to uniformity would require denial
of damages for loss of consortium to beneficiaries of non-seamen. Moreover,
weighing against this narrow view of uniformity is the important interest of
treating all parties in personal injury and death cases equally, regardless of
whether the tort is maritime or land-based.
Of course, should death occur on the high seas, the DOHSA comes into play
and the distinction between seamen and non-seamen is inapplicable, because the
DOHSA applies to all persons killed on the high seas regardless of the status of
adjudication by a presumably seaman-sympathetic jury in Jones Act cases was congressionally
intended to provide "part of the remedy." Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 360 (5th Cir.
1980) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shippman, 411 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)). See also In
re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Under the Jones Act, a defendant must
bear the responsibility for any negligence, however slight, that played a part in producing plaintiffs
injury."); Force, supra note 11, at 7-8.
180. This point was seized upon by the court in Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622,
644 (3d Cir. 1994), which stated:
[In an accident on a ship in which a non-seaman and a seaman were each killed, the non-
seaman's survivors would potentially be entitled (depending on the state statute) to higher
damages than those available to the survivors of the seaman. This result, however, is
untenable only if we assume that a person's statutory status should be irrelevant for
purposes of determining recovery for maritime deaths. But Miles, by denying loss of
society damages to the survivor of a seaman because the seaman was covered by the
Jones Act, has told us that such status does make a difference.
(Vol. 55
ROBERT FORCE
the decedent and the tortfeasor. It seems, in such situations, that loss of
consortium could not be recovered short of overruling Higginbotham, as
suggested earlier, or re-examining the significance of the word "pecuniary" in the
DOHSA in light of the prevailing view in the United States on recovery of
damages for loss of consortium.
A distinction should also be made between a suit brought by a seaman's
beneficiaries against the decedent's employer and a suit against a non-employer
defendant. The Jones Act creates a negligence action only against a seaman's
employer. It does not create any rights against non-employers. Therefore, there
is neither a statute nor a congressional policy restricting the award of damages
in suits against non-employers. There are rational reasons for allowing a
seaman's beneficiary to recover loss of consortium against a non-employer and
yet deny recovery against an employer. The first is based on the Court's premise
in Miles that, under the Jones Act, Congress intended to restrict recovery in
wrongful death actions to pecuniary loss. As stated above, the Jones Act creates
a negligence action that is more advantageous to seamen on the liability issue
than the general maritime law negligence action. It may be argued that the
restriction on the scope of damages should be considered as part of a "trade-off."
In other words, Jones Act beneficiaries get the benefit of substantive rules which
make it easier to establish liability, and employers get the benefit of the
"pecuniary" damages restriction. However, in actions against a non-employer,
a person who happens to be a Jones Act seaman is relegated to the general
maritime law, as is a non-seaman. Where the beneficiaries of a seaman cannot
bring suit under the Jones Act and invoke the benefits of that statute because the
defendant was not the decedent seaman's employer, it seems unfair to impose the
Jones Act detriment by way of restrictions on damages. The Jones Act imposes
liability on a specified class of defendants, employers of seamen. The court in
Miles believed itself constrained by the Jones Act from imposing on this
designated class of defendants more extensive liability under judge-made law
than Congress had seen fit to authorize. This deference to the Jones Act
employer is inapplicable in an action against a defendant who was not the
seaman's employer. None of the major cases decided by the Supreme Court,
Sieracki, Moragne, Gaudet, or Alvez, involved a suit against the decedent
longshoreman's or injured longshoreman's employer. Suits against employers
are virtually precluded under the LHWCA. Thus, the rules applicable to suits
by seamen and maritime employees against their employers and suits by seamen
and maritime employees against non-employers have always differed.
A rigid pursuit of uniformity could result in other inequities. Assume that
three people are on Vessel 1 in territorial waters: a seaman, a longshoreman,
and a passenger. Another vessel, Vessel 2, is operated negligently and collides
with Vessel 1, killing all three persons. Wrongful death actions are commenced
against Vessel 2 in regard to each death. Why should the seaman's dependents
not be able to recover the same damages as the others? As to a suit against a
stranger who is not the employer, the seaman should not be regarded as a
seaman at all. His status vis-a-vis the stranger is no different than that of the
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longshoreman or the passenger. His dependents are not basing any special claim
on his capacity as a seaman. An allegation thathe was a seaman on Vessel 1
is irrelevant to the wrongful death claim. Therefore, Miles should not control
this collision situation or any other situation in which the decedent's status as
seaman is irrelevant to the claim."
By contrast, it is difficult to formulate a meaningful distinction in suits
against a seaman's employer, on the loss of consortium issue, between injuries
that do not result in death and those that do, as was the case in Miles. One
might argue that the DOHSA is not relevant, and that, in the Jones Act, Congress
excluded the recovery of a beneficiary's non-pecuniary damages in a wrongful
death action, but Congress has not addressed the right to recover loss of
consortium in a non-death case. But this argument is not persuasive. There is
no reason to believe that Congress intended to deny recovery for loss of
consortium in death cases but to allow recovery in personal injury cases. Either
the Jones Act precludes the recovery for loss of consortium, or it should be re-
interpreted to permit recovery directly, as suggested above, or supplementally,
through the general maritime law. It is difficult to understand how a principled
distinction could be made without overruling Miles and some earlier cases.
It is also difficult to formulate a meaningful distinction on the loss of
consortium issue between a dependent spouse-plaintiff and the non-dependent
parent-plaintiff in Miles in suits against a deceased seaman's employer. To
introduce such a distinction at this time would require Miles to be overruled'
almost in its entirety, for this is precisely the distinction drawn by the Fifth
Circuit and a majority of lower courts that was clearly rejected by the Supreme
Court.
S. Conclusion
The holding in Miles, that damages for loss of consortium and for future lost
wages are not recoverable in a general maritime law action arising from the
death of a Jones Act seaman, is not a momentous development. In a narrow
sense, it means only that a decedent's family will recover somewhat less than if
those items were included as elements of damages. What is disturbing, however,
is the rationale for the Court's decision. The approach taken by the Court
creates considerable uncertainty as to the scope of its decision. As has been
demonstrated above, the Miles decision has created more questions than answers.
It is possible that the problems created by Miles' rationale will snowball in the
lower federal courts resulting in the disappearance of elements of damage or
even substantive causes of action which heretofore have been well-established
in maritime law. The Court's approach introduces needless disunity between
land-based tort law and maritime tort law, and ignores the trends and develop-
181. It should be noted, however, the observations with respect to the DOHSA made in the
discussion of non-seamen are applicable here.
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ments in modem American tort law. If extended to other issues, this approach
represents a threat to the concept of the "general maritime law" as it has
developed from the very beginning of this country. To suggest, as the Court has
in Miles; that one or two tersely written remedial statutes enacted to deal with
specific shortcomings in the common law somehow preempt the courts from
developing and applying related general maritime rules is distressing and bodes
ill for the future. Congress undeniably has the authority to enact a comprehen-
sive code of maritime personal injury law, but it has not chosen to do so!
Historically, Congress has fixed a problem here and has modified a judicial rule
there. In the main, however, Congress appears to have been content with its
partnership with the courts, which has allowed it to enact legislation only when
the courts have not created a satisfactory response to a problem.
The late Judge John R. Brown understood the broader and more troublesome
aspects of the decision in Miles. He realized that the approach followed by the
Court represented a radical departure from the historical role of admiralty judges
in the United States and that this departure threatened the traditional partnership
between the admiralty courts and Congress. As he presciently observed:
The decisions in Higginbotham and Miles represent a complete
reversal of the roles of admiralty judges and Congress. Prior to these
decisions, admiralty judges exercised their Constitutional duty to declare
the admiralty and maritime law based on enlarged principles of justice
combined with the customs and usages of the sea. Admiralty judges
were not bound by technical rules, common law distinctions, feudal
concepts or limitations imposed by jealousy-based wars about jurisdic-
tion in England. Seamen were considered to be wards of the admiralty
court and were treated with special solicitude by admiralty judges.
The reversal of roles articulated by the current Supreme Court
denigrates not only the Constitutional duty entrusted to admiralty
judges; it also turns back two centuries of leadership of both the
admiralty law and the common law. The mere fact that Congress has
legislated in an area is insufficient to preempt maritime remedies in the
absence of Congressional purpose to do so. The affirmative interven-
tion of Congress in the maritime field should be interpreted in a positive
and supportive fashion and should not be used to emasculate the power
of admiralty judges to declare admiralty law. As Justice Story
concluded, even a strong implication by Congress is insufficient to
deprive admiralty judges of their duty to enunciate the law in conformi-
ty with governing maritime principles. Only an express prohibition by
Congress can serve to deny admiralty judges the power to declare
admiralty law which was delegated to them by the Constitution." 2
182. Brown, supra note 71, at 283-84.
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The curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. has caused some lower federal
courts to abandon their traditional role as admiralty judges. The approach used
by the Court in Miles is beginning to exert an hypnotic effect on some federal
judges, leading them to forsake substance for form. The lure of "uniformity" has
drawn and will continue to draw courts to a mechanical, rather than a reasoned,
approach to the resolution of issues. Congressional legislation has become
talisman; and, worse yet, "deference to legislative intent," both real and
imagined, has enticed some federal judges into abandoning their unique,
important, and constitutional responsibility in declaring the general maritime
law.1 83 A careful study of history, the value of tradition, and the very difficult
task of balancing competing interests in the light of the policies of federal
maritime law are being abandoned for the "easy" way out.
183. Kimball, supra note 165, at 330-32. The author concludes that
Miles detracts from the longstanding role of the Admiralty Court, quite unnecessarily.
Deference to a co-equal branch of government is one thing, but actually saying that the
Court is limited in the field of maritime law by what Congress decides is quite
another.... Miles is a step in the wrong direction which sacrifices the Admiralty Court's
independence, and ... the lower courts are already following in the wrong direction.
Id. at 332.
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